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THESIS
Modern Theories of Sin
John Eckel Riley
I
Introductory,
A, Modern interpretation of sin.
1. Popular attitude on the question of sin.
Sin, like its infinite Judge, has been escorted to
the edge of the universe and politely bowed out. There are
many unenlightened people and super-sensitive consciences
that still shudder before this chimera of the past, but the
sane, critical, unbiased minds of the day no longer have any
fear or use of it except for rhetorical purposes. Psy-
chology and the anthropo centric method in general have reveal-
ed the relativity of morals and have given a rational account
of their origin and nature. Science and the rejection of
authority have decided that God does not have much, if any-
thing, to do with us; he may have set us up in business some
time or other, but he has certainly left us to determine our
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own weights and measures. Then certainly it is ridiculous
to establish any standard of conduct other than socially
agreeable utility.
Harry Elmer Barnes in one of his iconoclastic
speeches says that the "new cosmic perspective and Bibli-
cal criticism, indeed, rule out of civilized nomenclature
one of the basic categories of all religious and metaphys-
ical morality, namely, sin. One may admit the existence of
immorality and crime, but scarcely sin, which is by technical
definition a wilful and direct affront to God - a violation
of the explicitly revealed will of God." After s6me fur- o
rther discussion.
,
he concludes, "Consequently if we do not
and can not Imow the nature of the will of God in regard to
human behavior, we can not very well know when we are viola-
ting it# In other words, sin is scientifically indefinable
and unknowable. Hence sin goes into the limbo of ancient
superstitions such as witchcraft and sacrifice. The pycho-
analyses have already shown that the * sense of sin* is but a
psycho-physical attribute of adolescent sentimental develop-
ment." *^
Most beliefs are not based upon logic, though they
probably are remotely connected with some logic or facts;
they are rather based upon the temper of the mind. And this
is true of the thought world today; a one-sided set of facts
has made the modern mind agnostic, atheistic, and irreligious.
1. A Scientist's Blast at God and Sin. Literary Digest Jan. 26,* 29
9
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Joseph Wood Krutch*s book "The Modern Temper" has such chapter
heads as The Tragic Fallacy, Disillusion with the Laboratory.
He says, "adopt a certain style of living and acting, exactly
as an artist adopts a certain style for the execution of a
work of art" - morality is just fidelity to that style of
living. There is no good reason for idealism; "love is at
times only a sort of obscene joke" and much the same may be
said for all of life's ideals. "But the joke," he adds, "is
one which turns quickly bitter upon the tongue, for a great
and gratifying illusion has passed away, leaving the need for
it still there." Then with the persistent pessimism of
Bertrand Russell He gays, "Ours is a lost cause and there is
no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not for
em that sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than
live as animeils." *1
This is not the only temper of the modem mind; it
is but one of a thousand. On the whole, however, the modem
mind is skeptical and optimistic, - skeptical of anything
ancient or supernatural, optimistic in its belief in human
progress and in its faith in the power of man. It has cast
aside everything of the absolute in religion and ethics, and
has courageously put its trust in relativity. It has been
forced, on the one hand, to acknowledge the relativity of
•things as they seem*; on the other hand, it has not thought
*1. A review in The Catholic World, May 1929
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deeply enough to find the absoluteness of some * things as
they are*. It is moral and irreligious, - moral because it
is more socially conscious than it ever was beik^e, irrelig-
ious because the finding of natural causes and the satisfac-
tion that comes with social service (in the profound sense)
has abolished the need of God* It is refreshingly frank and
bold; it ruthlessly investigates sacrosanct regions and
finds that with investigation the mystery vanishes.
The prohibitions of the past are coldly and irrev-
erently scrutinized; many of them go by the board. It is
natural that the belief in the tentativeness of morals should
lead to the feeling that what a man wants he should have.
Morals are in the test tubes of experience; a few valid con-
clusions have been made, but very few; since all the facts
are not in, the basest metal challenges the purest gold and
none can rebuke it# To change the figure, "it is about as
hard to get a conviction of sin these days in the courts of
God as it is to get a conviction of Volstead violation in
the courts of New York," And that is not strange, for
there is no court of God and there are no laws and of course
there is no punishment. This modem release from the prison
of well known, unquestionable responsibility has resulted in
a devil-may-care pursuit of "thrills** and a glorious run of
the gamut of life's emotions. Recently I read in a Boston
*1, The Vanishing Sinner. Harper's November 1950
1t
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newspaper of a suicide: the young man, brilliant, popular,
had tried everything else and had found himself bored; apol-
ogizing for leaving his body before a friend* s residence, he
tried the last thing, death. Men have always been doing
that and I do not think our fair generation is going to die
by its own hand, but no one questions that there is released
in society a new forcey of freedom, terrible and yet glorious*
The great antidote for the dangers of this freedom
is the deep, abiding humani tari anism of the day, the sense
of the glory of man's own self and the sense of duty to so-
ciety as a whole. These are the two great foci of interest,
not self and Gfod, the older order, but self and society.
Would you accuse a man today, you must show him that he is
harming society and blighting his fellowman; there is little
use to iterate the threatenings of Jehovah or the longsuffer-
ing of the Father. The thunderstorm is no longer the wrath
of God; as for the Father caring for us - we are too thorough-
ly taken up with the surge of life to bottier with God and if
He is so great he doestnot need our attention. Religion has
lost its place as a determining factor of life; it still
remains as one of the arts and is relatively safe when con-
served by beautiful cathedrals and organ music. Where it "la.
survives, it is aesthetic and ritualistic; that kind of re-
ligion generally can find a place even in the scientific,
critical mind*
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Miles H. Krumbine *1 asks if we are to have a non-
moral religion: "The age of moral fervor is ending; the era
of the aesthete has begun. The raucous voice of the prophet
must take on the soothing modulation of the priest," Robert
Hall was upset for a week because by reading Mss Edgeworth
"he saw a picture of a world of happy, active people without
any visible interference of religion. It was a sensible
world, and
,
on the whole, a very healthy world, and yet a
world without any warnings and exhortations, without any
apparent terrors concerning the state of souls. The sanc-
tions, restraints, and aspirations that religion confers
were totally lacking, and yet the world was happy, prosperous,
and well off.... Are we not on the verge of exactly that
experience? Our only hope will turn on the emergence of a
group of prophets who can again socialize and moralize God
as a group of prophets did once, eight centuries before
Christ."
Theology could once appeal to ethics for support,
but now science is doing away with sin and calling it igno-
rance and weakness. "The objectivity granted to the deliv-
erance of the moral consciousness, either by the 'intuition-
al' school in its theory that the moral axiom is eternal and
immutable, a subject of cognition equal to the axioms of
geometry or logic, or of the 'practical reason' school, which,
following Kant in isolating the moral faculty from intellec-
*1. Atlantic Monthly. December 1929
it
7tual explanation, yet gave to it absolute validity - such
objectivity is either denied or ignored by the new school in
Ethics." *^ "The moral concepts are based upon emotions,
and the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the
category of truth." ^ The failure of society to rise to
an adequate concept of sin is not due to low standards as
much as it is to philosophical and scientific evolution. It
seems that, unless there is a reconciliation of the theologi-
cal, redemptive view and the worldly, hopeful, evolutionary
view, the former will disappear altogether.
Allowing for the distinction between the breaking
of God's law and the breaking of society's law the modem
mind rejects or ignores the first (which is sin in the strict
sense) and denies the objective authority of the second
(morals) . If the second is being shaken to its very roots,
the first can have little hope of surviving. Since there is
no great interest in religion or theology, there can hardly
be any great interest in sin, for that is the one thing most
gladly dispensed with even by theologians. The sense of sin
can only exist where there is a consciousness of imperfection
o v\ e.
and guilt; that is the sense of sin. Now, on the ^^iaer hand,
psychologists are showing us that much of what is called a
sense of sin is an inferiority complex eind can be remedied
I by mental clinics. On the other hand, the immanent, perfect
*1. Orchard's Modern Theories of Sin. page9
*2. Ibid, page 10 (quoted from Westermarck)
e
8God is being dismissed by the scientific spirit and with him
goes the sense of sin which is felt by finite beings before
the Infinite. Thus the sense of sin is being dissolved away
from both ends»
The popular mind, like Humeuiism, is trying to retain
the higher spiritual values of personality without keeping
CJod. And many who would keep Gtod are accomodating Him to their
own ideas by extracting sin from their theology. The question
is, Can we have God without a sense of sin? And can we have
high morals, in the long run, without God? Popular thinking
to the contreiry, I think we must answer both questions in the
negative. The Catholic World comments on the statement of
Harry Elmer Barnes already mentioned as follows: "There is
a fact of experience as old as history, as widely spread as
is the human race, and more intensely, irresistibly, impor-
tunately real than all the gathered experience of art and
policy and science, - the fact which philosophers call moral
evil, and Christians sin. It rests upon no questionable in-
terpretation of an Eastern allegory. We breathe it, we com-
mit it, we feel it, we see its havoc all around us. It is
no dogma, but a sad, solemn inevitable fact ... .Philosophers
have from time to time attempted to explain this dark exper-
ience away, and here and there men of happy temperament,
living among calm surroundings have been comparatively uncon-
scious of the evil in the world. But the common conscience
(
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is alike unaffected by the ingenuity of the one class, or the
apathy of the other; while it thrills to the voices of men
like St. Paul or St. Augustine, Dante or John Bunyan, Loyola
or Luther; recognizing in their sighs and tears and lamenta-
tions, the echo of its own unutterable sorrow made articulate...
And moral evil, independently of any theory of its nature or
its origin, is a plain palpable fact, and a fact of such
stupendous magnitude as to constitute by far the most serious
problem of our life." This statement concerning the "com-
mon conscience" does not necessarily contradict the statements
I have made concerning the lack of a sense of sin in the
"popular mind"; the former is more basic, more unaffected by
the fancies of the moment than is the latter.
2. Trend of modern theories of sin.
In the modern theories of sin there is a change
from the theocentric, objective, authoritative, to the anthro-
po centric, experimental, and relative. There is a reaction
against court terms, against the over-depreciation of maji;
there is a new emphasis on the likeness of man to God. There
is the introduction of development and evolution as against
providential intervention, rational as against non-rational,
naturalism as against supernaturalism, socialism as against
I individualism. One of the greatest influences in the field
*1. The Fact of Sin. Catholic World. April, 1929
I
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of morals today is the influence of science toward determin-
ism. It is constructing an unbroken chain of cause and ef-
fect 77hich seems to eliminate God eind to give personality
merely secondary value in a world of matter.
Ralph W. Sockman has recently written three articles
on sin and morals. The first of these is The Vanishing Sin-
ner €ind is worthwhile quoting. "The traditional termi-
nology of the Church in this matter of sin has been a court-
room vocabulary" and the court room scene is no longer part
of the modern world view. "In the first place, the idea of
God as a Judge sitting to sentence individual miscreants is
difficult to grasp in the universe of immeasurable spaces
and innumerable suns." "A second obstacle in securing mod-
ern convictions of sin is the seeming uncertainty of the
divine laws which the sinner is accused of violating. .. .When
he regards moral codes as man-made, the legalist can be con-
victed of unconventionality, but not of sin." "The modern
mind is lacking also in its labelled exhibits of sin"; in-
sanity, epilepsy, earthquakes and floods "were interpreted
as divine punishment for perversity." Now the examples of
sin are not so concrete. There is a lessening in the passion
and volume of the denunciation of sin. The "new insights of
biology, psychology, and sociology have lifted the subject
of sin out of the atmosphere of personal guilt into the ob-
jectivity of social and statistical science. .. .As Hocking
*1 Harper's November 1930
V1
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of Harvard puts it, 'The sense of sin, which is at home in
the solitude of individual conscience can hardly survive in
the universalizing atmosphere.
(a) Schleiermachi^an influence - One of the most significant
contributions to the doctrine of sin is that made by Schleier-
macher, i.e. the introduction of the experimental method. He
said that one cannot know what sin is until one has investi-
gated the faculty which reveals it (GrOd consciousness) and
the experience of redemption. This psychological study of
religion is the beginning of modem theology and religious
science. The other contribution which Schleiermacher made
was to point out more clearly the social character of sin;
it is"in each the work of all, and in all the work of each."*l
So closely allied to Schleiermacher that I will put them to-
gether is Albrecht Ritschl. He has made two contributions
to the doctrine of sin also: (1) He explained more clearly
the social solidarity of sin; (2) He said that sin is due in
large measure to ignorance.
There are then three elements in the influence of
Schleiermacher and Ritschl:
(1) The nature of sin must be determined by our exper-
ience of sin and redemption, not by theological abstractions;
we must begin with ourselves and our religious and moral nature.
(2) Sin is social, it is a network of evil in which we
*1. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, page 288
•41
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are all involved, it is "in each the work of all and in all
the work of each." This social solidarity takes the place
of the old doctrine of original sin; the individual is so
closely bound to society that he almost invaribly absorbs the
evil in society to some degree and in turn makes his contri-
bution to social sin. This is one of the most significant
characteristics of the modern attitude on the nature of sin.
Ritschl pictures the Kingdom of Sin versus the Kingdom of God.
(3) Sin is due in large measure to ignorance, Ritschl
emphasized this until one is almost tempted to think he made
sin nothing but ignorance. At any rate, since there is some
measure of ignorance present, forgiveness is more natural and
man can more easily separate himself from sin,
(b) Evolutionary influence - There has been nothing more
revolutionary than evolutionary thought, be it theistic or
mechanistic. The greatest representatives of evolution are
Darwin, Spencer, and Hegel; none of these left an adequate
place for sin. Only an evolution which regards personality
as a creation of the Infinite Person can adequately explain
personality; morsQ. never evolved from unmoral, nor spiritual
from material. Hegel with his dialectic made sin a necessity
and thus made it no sin at all. Spencer reduced ethics to
utility; the moral intuitions are the slowly accumulated
methods of adaptability acquired by the race. The experiences
of utility have become in us certain emotions corresponding
^m
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to right and wrong conduct. In these naturalistic theories
of evolution ideals appear as inert by-products of physi-
ology"; in other words, there is really no place for morals.
In theistic theories of evolution morals have a
place, but it is a different place from that given them in
the older orthodox theory* Man's basic nature, moral self,
is the creation of the Supreme Person; the race is modified,
developed, advanced, governed, by its own adjustment to its
environment and its molding of the environment itself. This
is radically different from the older theory of the primal
perfection of man and the fall; yet it seems to me that it
must allow for a fall of its own, for there must have been
a time when man came to be moral as distinguished from what
he had been, unmoral. At that moment when he became moral,
or at some time later, man loiew the better, but did the worse.
No matter how many stages of evolution, no matter how fine
the distinction, there must have been a time when there was
a passing from the non-moral to the moral; that state of
morcLlity corresponds to the BibliceG. teaching of original
perfection, and the first sin after that state of morality
was reached corresponds to the Biblical Fall. Practically,
however, there is a great difference between evolution and
the older orthodoxy.
*1. (Wm. James. Pragmatism. pagel6) Present Tendencies, p. 47
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Evolution has shown the relativity of standards
and the continuity of history. It has shown some things
hitherto considered inviolable to be superficial; it has
adopted new modes of thought, accepted new contributions of
a divinely ordered process instead of rejecting them as per-
versions from the truth; it has analyzed the march of histo-
ry through time and has rationally selected the dynamic,
eternal principles and rejected the static and temporal. It
has accounted for much of sin by indicating^ physiological,
psychological, or social causes; this has been of invaluable
service. But it has sometimes explained sin and morals away;
€ind when morals have been dismissed the meaning of life is
gone.
(c) Rationalistic influence - Rationalism is the antith-
esis of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism. It is funda-
mentally critical and inductive; it is empirical; it estab-
lishes reason as the highest court of appeals. When carried
to the extreme, Intellectualism, it is not favorable to re-
ligion; as in the 18th century practically all sense of sin
was lost. When it is balanced by experience and a consider-
ation for all the facts, aesthetic, intellectual, moral, and
religious, it is one of the most valuable friends of truth
and religion. Error alone need fear reason. Rationalism has
emancipated the individual and society from the blight of
circumscribed, dictated modes of thought. The twentieth
It
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century owes its glory to this emancipation of some two cen-
turies ago. Rationalism has rejected the over-depreciation
of man and has declared the likeness of man to God. It has
repudiated the highly speculative intellectualism of the
middle ages and allied itself with the scientific, evolution-
ary, and empirical trend.
(d) Scientific influence - Scientific criticism is the
term which describes this age more completely than any other.
It has revolutionized philosophy, theology, ethics, religion
and every field of learning. It has overstepped the mark
sometimes and has offered itself as a substitute for religion.
Science is just an instrument and may be either good or bad;
back of it must be ethical principles and religious hopes or
it is barren beyond measure. The field of science is phe-
nomena; consequently, when made a philosophy or religion it
is the extreme of Naturalism and Positivism.
There have been three practical, though not neces-
sary, effects of the emphasis on science* :
1. Science has encouraged Materialism and Positivism
and has tended to eliminate God from human thought. This
has resulted because science has not been limited to phenom-
enal and philosophy to metaphysical reality.
*1. Dean Knudson. Lectures in Pres. Tendencies.
*2. Ibid.
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2. Science has tended to dethrone man from his central
place in the universe. The vastness of the universe and the
ruthlessness of law have made man shrink into nothingness.
3. It has tended to transform nature into a self-run-
ning mechanism. Every natural explanation given for the
phenomena of life has seemingly denied man metaphysical free-
dom just that much.
There is no need for theology to fear science when
it is restricted to phenomena. It is then one of its great-
est servants.
3, Advantages and perils of such a trend.
The trend of theology in general and the doctrine
of sin in particular has been toward Naturalism. The advan-
tages of this trend are: (1) It has abolished authoritarian-
ism and Traditionalismj (2) It has substituted natural^ for
much supernaturalism, rational for irrational; (3) It has es-
tablished intellectually respectable evolution and scientific
criticism; (4) It has given the personality of man a deter-
minative place in the universe and has humanized theology.
This trend has all the dangers of Naturalism if it
goes to the extreme. It really eliminates morality and per-
sonality, finite and infinite, from the universe. It loses
its appreciation for the individual and for Christ. It
casts itself headlong into Mechanism, Determinism, and a
dark abyss of pessimism. Of course the place which Schleier-
macher gives to the personality of man, particularly the re-
ligious nature, is one thing that holds modem science from
ic
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naturalism. It is one of God's providences that Individual-
ism arose with science; the one aids and counteracts the other.
B. Fundamental problems involved in a theory of sin,
**A11 crimes," says Hobbes in A Dialogue of the Com-
mon Laws, "are indeed sins, but not all sins crimes. A sin
may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which
*1
neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man can take notice,"
For an adequate understanding of the problem of sin
one must have a background of ethics. There are some who
would identify the sense of sin with embarassment , lack of
psychological balance and such like. Like the magician,
ethicists generally get out of the hat what they put in it.
If one is the crassest kind of utilitarian, sin is weakness,
is ineffective production. If one is a Humanist, sin is an
ancient superstition. If one is a theistic personalist, sin
is a profound moral and spiritual problem. One may recognize
and decry sin practically and not recognize it theoretically.
But a theory of ethics is essential to a theory of sin.
Ethics is popularly understood as having to do di-
rectly and exclusively with my relations to my fellowmen;
sin is poptilarly understood as having to do directly and ex-
clusively with my relations to God. Both these definitions
*1. Sin; (.Christian)^ byH. R. Mackintosh;
Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R, and E, Vol, XI page 546
0\)
(
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are merely relative. Ethics include all of my moral life
7/ith my relations to myself, to my fellows, and to Goa; and
sin is anything which is unethical. Thus strictly speaking
there is no distinction between sin and immorality. To any
one who wishes to reserve the term sin strictly for offenses
against God, I have this to say: in the moral order with
God as its supreme head no one can commit an offense against
God without committing an offense against the whole moral
order.
Futhermore no one can commit an offense against
his fellow creatures without offending God. Thus the man
who is irreligious is an immoral person, and the man who is
immoral is not religious in the true sense of the term. Be-
cause of this inter-relatedness of the moral order, I pre-
fer to identify sin and immorality, understanding them both
as violation of my moral nature. This identification rec-
ognizes the religious character of the term "sin" as it is
generally used. At the same time it unifies the moral order
by indicating that man owes it to his fellov/s to be in right
relationship to God. If this identification of sin and inmioral-
ity is rightly understood, religion takes on a rigorous moral
complexion and morality becomes definitely personal and religious.
While there is a difference in kind between one's duty to God
and one's duty to man-the one is the love of created for Creator,
the other is the love of created for fellow creature
—
yet the
two are essentially connected and are ethically the same.
•
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There is a very vital connection between metaphys-
ics and ethics, ^There may be a practical morality or even
a more or less scientific attempt to analyze and formulate
a system of ethics without metaphysics, but a purely ethical
science which attempts to avoid metaphysics must correspond
very imperfectly with our idea of philosophy, A sound sci-
ence of morality implies a sound metaphysics.X^"^ Some sys-
tems of metaphysics can allow for no real morality, 6ne of
these is Materialism: matter fills out the entire category
of being; mind is just an epiphenomenon, a b3q)roduct of the
nervous system; the brain secretes thought like the liver
secretes bile. Pantheism or Absolutism, if at all consistent,
has no place for morality ot freedom; finite selves are mere-
ly phenomenal, they are not real. Naturalism is generally
as exclusive of morality as Materialism is, though the high-
er Naturalism provides for a sort of morality. Agnosticism,
when it is thorough-going, makes morality improbable. Ideal-
ism, or Personalism, is the only system which adequately
answers the demands of morality; at least it answers them far
more satisfactorily than any other.
Without delving into metaphysics, v/e will accept
Personalism and turn to find our bearings in the realm of
ethics. There are four or five great schools of ethics which
It
X
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I will consider: Psychological Hedonism, Universal Hedonism
or Rationalistic Utilitarianism, Intuitionism, Philosophical
Intuitionism^and Ideal Utilitarianism. There is neither time
nor need to develop these extensively, since Hasting Rashdall*s
Theory of Good and Evil and other such books give volumes to
them. Psychological Hedonism says that actions are right or
wrong according as they do or do not tend to produce maximum
pleasure; it is based on the psychological theory that noth-
ing can be desired except pleasure. This is contrary to ex-
perience: we Imow of acts of self-sacrifice which positively
do not have pleasure as their sole motive. Some one has said
that no poor wretched man would consent to be changed into a
monkey or a pig even if all his monkey and pig desires would
be satisfied. VOiy? Because there is a qualitative difference
between pleasures; as soon as quality is mentioned something
other thein pleasure is involved. Universal Hedonism is an
attempt to introduce altruism into Psychological Hedonism;
it is a higher type of ethics, but it falls into the same
difficulty. It must recognize some qualitative distinctions
in pleasure and as soon as it does it introduces some other
standard such as aesthetics or intellect. Intuitionism says
that actions are right or wrong without reference to conse-
quences; it holds that intuition or conscience, an internal
moral judgement, pronounces not only on principles, but also
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on particular incidents, and this aside from experience and
aside from consequences. Philosophical Intuitionism avoids
the difficulty of particularism, but it does not have a re-
gard for consequences. The greatest representative of this
school is, of course, Immanuel Kant. We agree with the Intui-
tionists in recognizing that there is that which is morally-
right, per se, intrinsically. When asked how we know these
things are good, we have to answer that we know instinctively
that they are good. But we object when the Intuitionists say
that principles and details are given without reflection or
without regard to consequences.
Ideal Utilitarianism, which is much the same as
perfectionism, combines the utilitarian principle with a non-
hedonistic view of the ethical objective. Actions are right
or wrong insofar as they tend to produce for all mankind an
ideal goal which includes but is not limited to pleasure.
That goal is made up far more of virtue, than of pleasure; it
is a hierarchy of values, ranging from intrinsic to instrumen-
tal values; the crown and key of that goal is personality,
*»They (beautiful characters) are the only phenomenon offered
to our sight which justifies the tears of things No man
standing free and sober and disillusioned ever said to a work
of art, The whole sad earth you justify.
I repeat: it is only an achievement in human form Y/hich can
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wring that cry from us. ^^o other beauty is vital and valid
il
enough." ^
My procedure has been swift and I have taken some
long steps, many of whioh would be questioned by Positivists
and Materialists. But my purpose is just to state my ethical
system. Having done so briefly, I have determined quite def-
initely some of the basic truths concerning sin.
1. Definition.
One of the most essential problems is the definition
of sin, for with the definition many useless arguments are
settled. There has been a lack of penetrating criticism and
carelessness in the use of terms. Yet it is a difficult thing
to define sin for a complete definition of sin is a theory of sin.
Sin is that which tends not to produce, or does not
tend to produce, for all mankind, the complex goal v/hich in-
cludes virtue and happiness, a hierarchy of values, the key
of which is personality. This is a broad definition; there
are some distinctions which must be made. There is a distinc-
tion between falling short of the ideal and personal demerit;
this distinction is not ao hard and fast as it v/ould be if
the ethical ideal were static instead of relative, but it is
nevertheless real. Every individual is much less successful
than he might be in bringing mankind to that ideal goal, but
*1. Salvation by Intuition - The Yale Review, Winter 1931 p. 270
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he is guilty only insofar as he has knowingly opposed its
progress or withheld his support. The race is not what it
should be. It is shamefully what it ought not to be, and the
moral blame-worthiness of the race is crushing; it is "in
each the work of all and in all the v/ork of each," Yet the
race, the collective group of individuals, is guilty only in-
sofar as wills have intelligently done wrong. The sense of
imperfection always comes with a consciousness of God* s per-
fection. As Isaiah said, "Woe is mel for I am undone; be-
cause I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst
of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the
King, the Lord of hosts," There are at least three elements
in this, the guilt of the individual, the guilt of the race
or of society, euad the imperfection of the finite.
There is also a distinction between actual sin and
the sense of sin; the two ought to correspond but they do not
always do so. Most people do not think deeply concerning
moral problems; they accept the dictates of society and the
teachings of the church. After that they judge right and
wrong merely by the sense of sin, their feeling concerning
particular acts. This "feeling" is the practical standard,
and generally it is according to this standard that men are
guilty or not guilty. But there must be some objective stan-
dard which it is the duty of men to learn; that is, men should
*1. Isaiah 6:5
(<
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not only respond to what they believe is right and good, but
should also seek: to knov; more truly what is right and good.
Then there is the distinction between sin and immo-
rality; the one is religious and the other ethioal. For the
theist I believe this distinction is just a practical one;
for the atheist it means nothing, since religion is non-existent.
2. Freedom of the will.
Determinism allows for no morality; it is all mere
seeming, Indeterminism is inadequate because it does not have
any regard for the individual or social effect of sin, "The
falsest of all heresies is Pelagianism; if life is built on
atomic lines, nothing like religion or morality is thinkable,"
says H. R. i^iackintosh of this species of Indeterminism. Self-
determinism alone explains the profound character of morality
and sin; it recognizes that without the intelligent free choice
of the agent there can be no morality, and at the same time
it recognizes the determining power of heredity, of environ-
ment, and of previous choice. Calvinism proposes that there
is ethical responsibility without freedom. But we cannot
conceive of there being any morality if finite spirits are
not free agents,
*1, Sin: Hastings* Encyclopaedia of R, and E. 538 - 543 Vol. XI
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3. Sin and guilt.
Sometimes the ancients mercilessly refused to rec-
ognize degrees of guilt. They did not give much attention
to the determinative factors in conduct, i.e. heredity, en-
vironment, and ignorance. Jonathan v/as condemned to death
by his own father because he had ignorantly disobeyed a proc-
lamation and had tasted a little honey. ^ Law was an objec-
tive fixed requirement with not enough regard for the sub-
jective elements.
Today the pendulum has swung to the opposite ex-
treme. Morals are democratic, the production of society, not
divinely given. Since the Lord Jesus Christ spoke, emphasis
has been placed upon the heart, the will, the purpose, rather
than on correspondence with an objective standard. Social
science and psycho-analysis have shown so convincingly the
large place that heredity and environment play, have produced
so many natural causes for moral evil, that it seems wrong
to ceill a man guilty. Babies should not be spanked; crimi-
nals should not be punished; sinners should not be condemned -
- they should be sent to mental clinics .
Elton Mayo in a psychological treatment says:
"Studies such as these take the investigation of Sin complete-
ly out of the realm of moral disquisition in which the nine-
teenth century placed it. Sin, spelled with a capital letter,
*1. I Samuel 14
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is a morbid mental trait, it is symptomatic of obsession in
however slight a degree. For so long as the morbid situation
persists, the individual's mental development is cramped and
hindered; he has difficulty in fixing his attention, his life
deteriorates into compulsive repetitions which are designed
to prevent the emergence into action of the desire formulated
in revery." *^
No one can have any objection to a rational, scien-
tific study of the mind, mental disorders, the development
of the personality and character. Many things that used to
be regarded as devilish dispositions have proved to be noth-
ing but sad mental disorders. The only reasonable way to
remedy the evils of society is to determine the nature of the
evil and then to apply the remedy. Some evils will be reme-
died by sanitation, some by police force, some by scientific
instruction, some by practical training. There are practical
reasons for many of the disorders of life, but neither exper-
ience nor morality will permit the complete negation of the
existence of great moral evil in the world. To deny that
finite wills are deliberately sinful and depraved is to close
one's eyes to one of the most apparent facts of society and
to abolish all ethical values.
Ignorance is one of the problems that affect the
guilt of sin. Socrates said that to know good is to do good.
*1. Sin With a Capital "S" - Harper*s April 1927
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§onie one moxQ modern says that to know all is to forgive all.
Ritschl says that all forgivable sin is in God*s eyes sin of
ignorance; this implies that there is no sin but ignorance
or that any knowing sin is unforgivable. Ritschl probably
just meant to indicate the large place which ignorance plays
in sin, W.S. Orchard says that no sin which is guilty can
be forgiven. We rather think that any sin which is not guil-
ty need not be forgiven. Sin is not merely ignorance, though
ignorance plays a large part in sin. Guilt is in inverse
proportion to ignorance.
"Christian theology must operate v/ith an idea of
guilt which is drawn from fully conscious moral experience...
Guilt is personal accountability and blameworthiness attach-
ing either to a voluntary infringement of the will of God,
in so far as tha^lwill is known to us or might have been known
except for previous sin, or to a condition of personal life
3kldirectly or indirectly consequent on such infringements." ^
4. 6rigin.
The Catholic World of April 1929 says: "And moral
evil, independently of any theory of its nature or of its
origin, is a plain palpable fact, and a fact of such stupen-
dous magnitude as to constitute by far the miost serious prob-
lem of our life." As important as it is to study the psycho-
logical and historical origins of sin and as startling as the
*1. Sin";. Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R.&E. Vol. XI 542
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discoveries that follow may be, it is utter folly to deny the
existence of morality, moral evil, or sin. They are facts of
the race and the race*s history; they throb in the heart of
man and guide the course of society.
)a) Fall — One of the most well known accounts of
the psychological and historical origin of sin is the story
in Genesis the third chapter. Today some of the psychologi-
cal truths of the account of the fall of Adam are accepted,
but generally the historicity of the account^S^ is rejected.
Dean Knudson says that the important truth of the Fall is that
"there is a great contrast between human life as it is and as
it ought to be."*"^ ^/Thether or not one recognizes the histor-
icity of the Genesis III account, one must recognize that
some time or other there was a historical introduction of sin
into the world and that the social effect of sin began at
that moment.
The rejection of the Fall is the result of evolution
ary thinking which holds that man is growing toward the per-
fection of maturity rather than that he has fallen from an
original perfection of maturity. The basic truth of both the-
istic evolution
€ind the older orthodox view of the Fall is
that man' s highest place is in happy moral communion with his
fellow man and with God. The next truth which both of them
claim is that "there is a great contrast between human life
as it is and as it ought to be." The next truth which both
of them acknowledge is that moral excellence is not given as
*1. Lectures in Systematic Theology.
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an ho^ry degree, but is^ through earnest striving. Adam may-
have been superbly wise, but what moral praise he had came
through resisting temptation and cleaving to the right. These
are fundamental truths and cannot be obscured by noisy polemic.
(b) Universality of sin — I have put this under the
the origin of sin because of its association with the Fall of
Adam. It is a deduction from the fact that Adam, the first
man, the representive of the race, sinned. It is the opinion
today that St, Paul meant to indicate Adam simply as the first
on© to commit sin rather than one who passed directly to every
man the moral taint; at any rate Paul was just using the phys-
ical unity of the race to illustrate the solidarity of be-
lievers in Christ.
Universality of sin is now generally regarded as an
induction from experience, not a deduction from the principle
that sin passed upon all the race without exception. "Dr. Ten-
nant and Professor Wheeler Robinson, like Ritschl before them,
have urged that we ought to treat the affirmation of univer-
sality as a generalisation rather than as a law —a thing
found true in all the past, but not rigorously predictable."*-^
The problem is—Does every one have to sin? If ei
every one has to sin then there is no sin except for Adam,who
brought upon the race the necessity of sin; and infinite would
be the guilt of Adam. "V/e do not doubt that it is in the
power of every will to make the grand choice, habitually suid
*1. Christianity and Sin — Mackintosh 156
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predominantly, of good against evil. Such a choice is possi-
ble to all, easy to none. If there is an imperious moral
claim on one side— the claim of freedom— there is an unques-
tionable moral fact on the other side; the fact of the world'
sin,"* It is possible that an individual upon coming to the
age of responsibility can, by adopting the right religious
and moral attitude, be enabled by the accepted grace of God
to live a sinless life. This is unquestionably so, theoreti-
cally. Practically, we iaaow of only one sinless heart and
life, the Lord Jesus Christ, This leads to our next problem.
(c) Hereditary depravity or original sin
Sometimes total depravity is the term used. They are not
identical but the three are about the same in significance;
the substance of the three is that man is morallj'" depraved
and cannot save himself. Dean Knudson has pointed out three
senses in which these terms are used; when the distinctions
are made there is much less difficulty. They are the relig-
ious, the abstract, and the concrete.^ In the religious
sense, which deals with the ideal, we all are wretched and
depraved; before the holiness of God only the morally dead
can fail to feel so. In the abstract sense, man without God
is totally depraved; insofar as man turns from God he is evil
because by rejecting God he is rejecting all that is good in
himself and in the universe. In the concrete sense, there is
something of Ood in every man; no man is totally depraved.
2. Lectures in Systema
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The first two of these terms are generally associ-
ated with Adam* s sin and often mean that guilt as well as m
moral depravity is in every child of the race. The Realistic
Theory and the Representative Theory try to rationalize the
guilty moral corruption which is said to be in every child.
There is no way to place upon innocency the guilt of another;
guilt is unalienable.
The truth which is poorly presented by these older
terms (at least often misrepresented in them) is given in
Schleiermacher' s and Ritschl*s doctrine of social solidarity.
"Modern thought, instead of linking our inborn evil constitu-
tion to our first parents, speaks rather of a sinful race or
community in whose evil we share, and insists that in this
field the idea of inheritance means that we infect those who
come after us as well as receive infection from our ancestors.
Not only so; it is rightly held that sin spreads in other ways
than by heredity, viz. through bad training, unworthy example
and tempting provocations. The traditional idea of total de-
pravity, while no doubt indicative of the fact that no part
of our nature is unstained and that we cannot of ourselves
do what is in the highest sense good, is nevertheless unscrip-
ti^l and untrue to life if taken to mean that non-Christians
are * utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all
good, and wholly inclined to all evil'."*^
*1. Sin: Hastings* Encyclopaedia of R. and E. Vol. XI 540
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The re-interpretation of total depravity does not
reduce sin to the Pelagian interpretation of it. The Christ-
ian view is that we need divine help to overcome sin. If sin
were no more than individual acts, we are as morally free to
choose the good now as if sin never was; we could then save
ourselves. "If sin were not super-individual, if man could
control sin by his own power, there would be no need of re-
demption."^--^ William Lyon Phelps says: "If we were naturally
good we should not need religion. If v/e were naturally virtu-
ous, industrious and reliable, we should not need restraining
and corrective forces Humanity needs every elevating in-
fluence, and the most elevating influence in the world is the
Christian religion. V/e need to be saved not once, but every
day, because nobody is safe In the eternal warfare be-
tween reason and instinct, between unselfishness and selfish-
ness, the enemy is not on the outside, nor is there any remote
or unusual danger to be feared. The enemy is encamped within,
in the heart of the citadel; we are in danger all the time."
The depravity of man does not mean that man is nat-
urally, normally evil. The Catholic teaching is that the
natural man, man as created, is evil; and that original per-
fection was something given to man by God, a gift, something
that did not belong to man; and that when Adam sinned the
gift of perfection was taken away and man was left with his
*1. The Ladies Home Journal. May 1925
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own faculties. The true view is that God gave man a kind of
perfection of his own, not as a gift (though all that man has
he has received) but as part of his very nature. Man is de-
pendent on God for the highest attainment in personality-
values; and insofar as he turns from God he is depraved, he
is revolting against his own nature and bringing disintegra-
tion upon himself. This is not an arbitrary law established
by God for the sake of keeping man*s attention; it is in the
warp and woof of a personalistic universe, of morality, of
man's own Nature.
(d) Non-temporal choice — Julius Miiller is one of
those who think that it is impossible to reconcile freedom
with the force of social depravity. Because of the power of
social depravity no finite self has a fair opportunity to
choose between good and evil. But to save freedom it is im-
practical to agree with Pelagianism and state that sin has
no permanent effect on character or on society. The only way
out of the dilemma is to postulate a pre-temporal or timeless
probation and choice. In this timeless choice, unhindered
by social sin or depravity, finite selves have torn themselves
loose from God and made self the principle.^
I respect Miiller' s trying to save both freedom and
the fact of super-individual sin, but I think that his pro'^p-
osition is inconceivable and too speculative. The Realistic
*1. See Miiller* s Doctrine of Sin, Vol.11 410f.
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Theory of original sin is of much the same character and is,
I think, about as satisfactory as a non-temporal choice.
II History of the Doctrine of Sin
This historical sketch is of the Christian viev/ of
sin and of course it must of necessity be very brief. It is
not much more than an outline to indicate the progress and
to give the historical background of the haiipartiological
problem,
A, In the Old Testament
The earliest ideas of sin in the Old Testament are
Pre-Christian and un-ethical; "the earliest doctrine of sin -
whether properly or only metaphorically so-called — is asso-
ciated with certain physical conceptions of divine * holiness'
•••It is found in Holy things, persons, and usages, and aveng
es itself automatically upon the rash intruder, '**'^ A forward
step is made with the belief that calamity indicates previous
transgression.
With the great prophets of the eight century B, C.
,
*1, Christianity and Sin. page 3
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Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, came the ethicizing of the
conception of God and of sin. They identified Jehovah with
"the moral principle of the universe"; they condemned cere-
monialism, and demanded righteous^ and obedience to moral law;
they announced an "iraaanent day of the Lord" when evil should
bs abolished and Gk)d and righteousness should rule.*"*"
There are two or three factors or developments in
later Old Testament ha^artiology. Mackintosh makes three.
"First we should mention the reaction in the age of Manasseh
towards heathenism of a gloomy type, with a development or
revival of terrible rites But more important than any-
thing else in Manasseh* s age was the tremendous fact of exile.
A third great influence was the personality of the priest-
prophet Ezekiel."*^ The last two are the most important.
The exile brought a profound sense of national and individual
sin and guilt. In the sixth century B. C. it was Ezekiel and
Jeremiah who spoke of the subjective character, the internal
taint, of sin.
The Old Testament asserts the universality of sin
(Psalms 14, Proverbs E0:9). It does not develop any formal
doctrine of the origin of sin, but explains sins according
to individual cases; the Fall does not seem to be regarded
as essential for the understanding of sin. The relation
*1. Doctrine of God. page 327
*2. Christianity and Sin. page 29
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between sin and suffering, particularly death, is a constant
problem. Deuteronomy 30, Ezekiel 18, Psalms 1, and others
suggest that man* s external circumstances correspond to his
goodness. That is one of the central problems in the Book
of Job, but Job finally repudiates the idea that the good
man always prospers materially.
B. In the New Testament.
Between the Old Testament and the New comes a period of Ju-
daism when there is a more elaborate development of the the-
ory of sin. It is a period of Pharisaism, of legalism, a
period when there is a lack of spiritual fervor and an abun-
dance of religious speculation; yet it was here that many
of the doctrines later accepted by Christianity originated.
It is enough to say that "the theology of Judaism sums up
consistently in favour of freewill and the possibility of
self-salvation."*"^ The Jewish literature of the 1st. centu-
ry, B.C. and A.D. , takes a somber view of man; it speak'^s of
"universal corruption." "Though sin may^e inherited, moral
freedom is intact, and man can choose whether he will or will
not live righteously The heart, not the flesh, is the seat
of the inborn evil impulse (ye^er hara) ; but at least the
flesh makes sin intelligible, and, as Holtyman put it, 'there
is no clear agreement whether the flesh represents a power
*1. Ibid. Page 54
one
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ethically indifferent or one that somehow leads to sin."*l
Much responsibility for sin belongs to evil spirits. Sin is
not put in relation to the love of God; it is rebellion a-
gainst God as ruler, judge, creditor.
The New Testament has a sublime ethics. Ceremoni-
alism, external form, legalism, are rejected for a rigorous
ethicai^nd religious sincerity; it is not every one that say-
eth, "Lord, Lord," but he that doeth the will of the Father
that is accepted. To the Pharisaical Jews Jesus says, "Is
it lawful to do good on the Sabbath day?" For an external,
arbitrary lav; there is substituted to a certain degree a law
which rises from the demands of man* s own nature — the Sab-
bath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath, There is a
profound recognition of the subjective character of sin; the
theme of the Sermon on the Mount is,-the law condemns or
praises acts, the Gospel condemns or praises even the thoughts
and intents of the heart. The one outstanding contribution
of the New Testament is that sin is not the violation of the
law of God as much as it is the rejection of the self-sacri-
ficing love of God. Coordinate with this, even greater than
this, is the truth of forgiveness. "The cardinal truth about
sin is that it can be so forgiven as to be replaced by Christ-
ian goodness, and that in His Son the Father has interposed
to put it away by the sacrifice of Himself."*^
*1. Sin: Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R. and E, Vol. XI 538f
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Jesus does not have a general doctrine of sin; He deals with
concrete sins, not with abstract considerations creating an
intellectual problem. Sin is a terrible fact, committed against
God as against our fellow man. Sin is religious as well as
ethical; all have sinned and come short. The heart is the
source of sin. Sin is guilty and must be forgiven. It is
terrible; even the disciples need God's continued mercy (Matt.
6:12; 18:23).
The doctrine of sin in the Johannine writings has been
said to be accidental or secondary.*-^ But John has a keen
appreciation of the character of sin; for him sin is closely
associated with disbelief in Christ and the rejection of the
light He brought. St. Paul has been the storm center of the
New Testament. Sin is universal and is what opposes the will
of God as made knov/n by the written law and by the law writ-
ten in every man's heart. St. Paul has two outstanding prin-
ciples concerning the power of sin: the first is the unity
of the race and its connection with the sin of Adam (but this
does not necessarily teach that the race is cursed merely for
Adam's sin); the second principle is "that the flesh is rad-
ically antagonistic to God: as has been said, it represents
for St. Paul *the virulence and constitutional character as
well «5 the omnipresence of sin' We must then believe
that to St. Paul the flesh is a power productive of sin not
because it is sin, but because sin, seated in the flesh as an
*1. Ibid.
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alien power, utilizes it as organ and instrument. Till
Christ came, the empirically sinful fleshly principle ruled;
ever since, the counteractive Spirit has been victoriously
on the ground."^
C. Early and Medieval View.
The early Church did not have a developed conception of
sin. Not that it was not interested in the practical problem,
for it was. Lapse into grave sin, particularly idolatry
,
adultery, or murder, forfeited salvation; but generally sins
were remitted by baptism. In general the Eastern Church xms
interested in a mystical redemption, the Western in justifi-
cation and forgiveness.
The high peak in medieval ha^squartiology is the Pelagian
controversy; the church finally agreed with Augustine but for
some centuries it compromised between the two. In opposition
to the Manichaeans Augustine insisted on the voluntary nature
of sin, yet against Pelagius he maintained that sin was a
pitiful necessity. "As a psychological indeterminist August-
ine conceded that man may freely prefer a less evil to a
greater; as a theological necessitarian he denied that with-
out grace any right act is possible. .. .Not merely particular
acts, but the nature, disposition and affections of man are
sinful and guilty throughout, incapable of any good."*^
Robert Mackintosh traces four motives in Augustine's doctrine
of sin and salvation. First"there is the harmartiological
*1. Ibid.
*2. Ibid.
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motive proper, given in a dread personal experience of help-
less guilt." Secondly, there is the experience of the heal-
ing touch of divine grace; this blends evangelism v/ith pre-
destinarianism or the absolute supremacy of God, Thirdly,
there are speculative or philosophical elements, and fourthly,
there is the sacramental motive •'^^ This last is illustrated
by the appeal to the practise of infant baptism,
Pelagius contended that sin consists of individual
acts only and leaves the will and nature unaffected; that
children are born sinless, that universality of sin (if a
fact) is due to bad example or defective education, that divine
grace is requisite only in the form of instruction and of
the example of Christ,
Augustine defined sin negatively; it is a privatio
boni. At the bottom it is pride, and the form which the per-
verted will takes in every man is concupiscence or lust. Men
are born not merely sinful, but guilty and meriting eternal
damnation.
In the following centuries emphasis changed from
act to disposition; mortal sin became love of the creature
instead of God, .^nselm made an advancement by showing indis-
putably the guilt of sin. It was still somewhat negative,
however, sin irs -^ha-t we have los-t in eoiapGt-3?-i-9<Mi to Adejii, though
mate?a:a:feiy i^ ia cKKKRip^-so^aoe
•
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The outline of the sin doctrine was clarified during
this early period. There are at least five distinct points.
First, St. Paul's sinful humanity has becomed totally depraved;
if Christ and the Church are necessary then there can be abso-
lutely nothing good outside of them. Secondly, there are
clearer ideas about Adam and free will. Thirdly, there is a
definitely taught transmission of sin from Adam, i.e. guilty
corruption, connected with biological reproduction and remov-
able by baptism. Fourthly, the remedy for sin is sacramental;
baptism is administered to infants as v/ell as to adults. Fifth-
ly, "Augustine definitely teaches the possibility of lapsing
from a state of grace."
D. Doctrine of the Reformation.
The Reformers strove "to accentuate the religious and
personal character of sin as interpreted by the light of rev-
elation. "*2 Sin is the want of faith, the failure to fear
and love and trust God; Luther almost identifies it with the
"faithless heart." The idea of inherited guilt was still
generally accepted and the reconciliation of inherited guilt
with the new sense of responsibility was not yet made clear.
Zwingli was about the only one to say that one can only speak
of sin when the individual has appropriated the consequences
of sin. The penalty of sin is*^ : (1) mors spiritualis, or
*1. Ibid. 103f.
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the loss of the divine image; (2) mors corporalis, including
sickness and outward evils as well as death; (3) mors aeterna,
or exclusion from everlasting life with God. There was a
neglect of the social power of sin due to the emphasis on
Adam's sin suid its consequences.
Luther is a great soul who, like Augustine, by his
own heart's conflicts introduced a new element of evangelical-
ism into the church. Justification by faith and the rejection
of sacramentarianism are the distinctive features of Luther.
The Lutheran Church soon dropped predestinarianism. It is
Calvinism that preserves the purest orthodox theology. It
emphasizes the guilt of sin even while holding to the predes-
tinarianism, to immediate imputation of Adam's sin, and to
salvation by faith; this inconsistency was accepted as one
of the theological antinomies. One of the problems which a
the question
arose in Calvinism was/ whether God appointed men to salvation
or damnation independently of Adam's fall ( supralapsarianism)
,
or, by way of punishment and redemption, as a consequence of
Adam's sin ( infralapsarianism) ; this indicates the type of
thought in the church at that time."* Then came Jonathan
Edwards who reduced Calvinism to a basis of philosophical de-
terminism. Mackintosh says that by this time v/e have passed
the historical watershed. "The tide of logical inference had
risen to its fullest in the Protestant scholasticism, threat-
*1. Christianity and Sin. 106f.
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ening to drown out the faith and the life it v/as meant to H
serve. Since then it has receded and is still going back."*^
And Arminianism was the beginning of that recession.
E. Post Reformation Views.
The greatest names in the history of the doctrine of sin
in modern times are Immanuel Kant, Schleiermacher
,
Ritschl,
Julius Muller, and F, R. Tennant. Tennant's "Origin and Pro-
pagation of Sin", the Hulsean lectures for 1901-2, is the
first work in English to accept the theory of evolution.
W. E. Orchard says in his Modern Theories of sin that there
has not been an exhaustive treatment of the subject since
Muller* s monograph in 1851. There probably is a reason. All
philosophy, theology and ethics particularly, have been under-
going a marked revolution in the last century; when everything
is in flux and flow no one will attempt to do an exhaustive
piece of work. The modern age is not ready to state its com-
plete opinion concerning sin, particularly since so many doubt
whether there be any such thing as sin,
18th century Rationalism with its evolutionary bent
taught that man could develop the good germ that was in him
and, crushing out the tiger and the ape, eventually rise above
desire into Liberty. Kant substituted for original sin a
philosophical analogue — "that radical evil in man as man,
the timeless origin of which is symbolized by the Biblical
*1. Ibid.
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story of the Fall."*-'- Schelling "gives his own philosophical
form to the antinomies of tradition, holding that, in spite
of a universal necessity rooted in the dark bases of God, evil
is man's choice, and every creature falls by its own guilt."*
To Hegel the Fall is a mythological representation of a neces-
sary process. Man, good by nature, must reach virtue by pass-
ing from innocence through sin. Innocence, which is absence
of will, is weak; in exerting his will man sins; to pass from
sin to virtue is a process of retribution and amendment.
This makes sin a necessary element of or in virtue. Schleier-
macher says that according to God*s ordinance man's sensuous
development has gotten ahead of his spiritual development.
Sin is the positive struggle of the former against the latter.
He vacillates between the opinion that sin is non-existent
for God and that it is caused by Him. Sin is a social fact.
With Julius Miiller sin is selfishness; finite selves have not
so much pre-temporally as timelessly torn themselves loose
from God and made self the principle of life, Ritschl's in-
terpretation of sin is religious, it is opposition to the
Kingdom of God. He indicates the social character of sin and
gives large place to the element of ignorance. F. R. Tennant
demands a plurality of developmental concepts of sin. Sin is
different from imperfection; only wilful acts can be sin, for
sin and guilt are correlative. He explains the origin of sin
*1. Sin: Hastings' Vol. XI 540
*2. Ibid.
c
45.
in the individual life by saying that the natural, organic
propensities provide the raw material out of which the will
constructs, "Man is conscious before he is self-conscious,
impulsively appetitive before he is volitional, and volition-
al before he is moral.
There are numerous others who make more or less
successful attempts to treat the doctrine of sin, Tullock
and H.S.V, Eok are two of the older theologians; Robert Mack-
intosh and W.E. Orchard are two recent writers. There would
probably be many more valuable treatises on this subject if
this age was a little more theologically minded.
Ca-nee^t of 3iN. f S'S
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Ill Current Theories
A. Necessitarian
The Theories of sin first break into the two large
classes, freedomistic and necessitarian. There is a tenden-
cy for these two to drift together; the former does not lean
too far toward Pelagius, because it has an appreciation of
the social character of sin; the latter, while it- regards
sin as a necessity, yet tries to retain freedom. Most of
the men in the former recognize the universality of sin and
Schleiermacher really says that sin is a necessity; most of
those in the latter class proceed as though man v/ere free
and responsible. And yet, despite these variations, I think
there stands a gulf between them.
There are three types under the freedomistic theo-
ries. Schleiermacher and Ritschl state very clearly that
method in theology is the religious. The former starts v.lth
the religious nature and with the sense of absolute dependence
he calls this the God-consciousness and confines doctrines to
the limits of Christian experience. The latter adopts the
same method but the touchstone of his theology is the Christ-
ian experience of justification and reconciliation. Tennant
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and Pfleiderer have greater freedom from traditional teaching;
they construct their theories of sin from a critical study
of experience and do not allow the Christian consciousness
such an authoritative place. It is this method of approach
that is most generally used today. I have called the last
group the logical theories. Kant and Miiller are both of the
older intellectualistic school, moved by the impulse to theo-
rize with not a great regard for experience. Because of his
stress on the good will Kant is very important in ethics and
in a theory of sin. Julius Miiller* s masterful work is the
last great monograph on the subject, says Orchard; but neither
of them -a*^ empiri cal enough.
1. Hegel Orchard and Mc Taggart both remark that Hegel's
doctrine of sin is complicated by the different points of view
and that it is only to be found scattered through his writings.
Hegel has adopted a logical formula which he tries to apply
to the Christian consciousness. Sometimes he makes concessions
to experience which threaten to ruin his dialectic. Some-
times it is doubtful whether he is talking of the individual
or of the race. In general, his system revolves around the
dialectic; Innocence (Thesis), Sin (Antithesis), Virtue (Syn-
thesis). There is something in Innocence that produces Sin;
Sin produces Retribution, Amendment and finally Virtue.
McTaggart gives two points which I am not so sure
can be proved. "In the first place the triad of Innocence,
Sin and Virtue is put forward by Hegel as the sufficient
•
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explanation of Sin, but not as the sufficient explanation of
Virtue. Sin never occurs except as the Antithesis of such
a triad, but Virtue. .. .can occur in other circumstances, and
not only as the Synthesis of Innocence and Sin. In the second
place, Hegel does not commit himself to the statement that,
wherever Innocence is found, the other terms must follow, but
only says that there is something in the nature of each term
which tends to bring on its successor."^
his will and thus becomes individual or sinful. Hegel says
that the "good man is good along with and by means of his will,
and to that extent because of his guilt. Innocence implies
the absence of will, the absence of evil and consequently the
absence of goodness..,.; in so far as he is good, it must be
by the action and consent of his will."*^ "Evil is first pre-
sent within the sphere of knowledge; it is the consciousness
of independent Being, or Being- for -self relatively to an
Other, but also relatively to an Object which is inherently
universal in the sense that it is Notion, or rational will.
It is only by means of this separation that I exist indepen-
dently, for myself, and it is in this that evil lies. To be
evil means in an abstract sense, to isolate myself; the iso-
lation which separates me from the Universal represents the
element of rationality, the laws, the essential characteris-
tics of Spirit, But it is along with this separation that
*1. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology 153
Man is innocent, neither badrior good until he asserts
Ibid. 154
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that Being- for self originates, and it is only when it appears
that v/e have the Spiritual as something universal, as law,
what ought to be."*-'*
It seems to me that McTaggart cannot defend his two
statements mentioned above, Hegel makes sin a necessity with-
out equivocation. He says that the state of innocence is
evil because it lacks will, the only thing that can be good
or evil. Then he says that the only mode of procedure from
innocence is to assert self in opposition to the whole, in-
dividuality in opposition to universality. Then reconcilia-
tion and virtue are found by elimination of the opposition.
If he had made it possible to move from innocence*~TT©ia^by any
other v/ay than by asserting the principle of self in opposi-
tion to the universal, he would have been acceptable; but he
did not. Sin is better than innocence because it is an asser-
tion of that which is worthwhile and is a step toward virtue.
It is not the final state, but it is a necessary ikte and is a
move toward virtue; so that sin is really virtue, a stage or
a part of it.
V/hatever is devoid of will is in harmony with the
universe; the only thing that can exist out of harmony with
the universe is will. The harmony of wills is intrinsically
of more value than any other harmony. Thus it is an evil to
remain in innocence. But the first step in the direction of
*1. Q,uoted in Orchard 67.
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virtue is the assertion of self as such. When self learns
that this state is an evil, it harmonizes itself with the
universal and thus finds virtue.
As it is stated, there is no recognition of moral
evil in this system. It is nothing more than the self seek-
ing for expression in its highest form. Hegel says it is a
necessary process, and it seems to be a wise, desirable pro-
gression from innocence to virtue. Instead of using the term
sin, which to say the least has a bad connotation, I would
use the term growth, or expansion, or progress. The only
place for moral evil that I can see in the system (and Hegel
does not designate this as the only sin) is in the refusal
of self, after having felt the obligation to ally itself with
the universal, to do so. If that is what Hegel meant by sin,
i.e. the refusal to progress after having seen the obligation
to do so or the deliberate^from the universal to the prin-
ciple of self, then I will accept his explanation of sin.
As he has stated it, it is too artificial. On the other hand
if he makes deliberate wrong-doing a necessity, as he does
in different places, then he is contradicting himself; univer
sal necessary deliberate wrong-doing is a sheer paradox,
such sin is no sin at all.
When he forgets his system Hegel shov/s that he rec-
ognizes, practically, the facts of sin, guilt, and repentance
Sin, which is seeking that which never satisfies, must in the
(
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long run always disgust the person who commits it. Thus Sin
produces Retribution or Punishment, which in turn produces
Amendment: Amendment comes when the self realizes that sin
it is not finding its highest place, and it in turn produces
Virtue. Hegel says that once Virtue is reached particular
imperfections are not removed by first emphasizing the com-
plementairy imperfection, and then rising to the point above
them both; the point above (virtue) may be reached by rising
directly from the imperfection. Thus the triangle may be-
come more and more like a straight line, though never quite
that. This allowance for a way to rise from a particular
thesis to a synthesis without the antithesis, does not remove
the necessity of sin from his system. It really introduces
an inconsistency.
McTaggart tries to justify Hegel by saying that all
"that is required of a theory of Sin.... in order that it may
be harmless to morality, is that it should not deny the dif-
ference between Virtue and Sin, or assert that Sin is the
greater good of the two. Hegel's theory does not do either.
To go farther, and to condemn Sin as absolutely and positive-
ly bad, is useless to morality and fatal to religion."*^
Sin, moral evil in the abstract, IS "absolutely and
n
positively bad; to say less than that is to assert that Sin
is good. Now, if McTaggart means that there are degrees of
sin I agree with him; the only person that could be absolutely
*1. Hegelian Cosmology. 174
I!
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bad v/ould be an infinite being absolutely resigned to evil.
I do not believe that there is any finite being who is com-
pletely bad in his finite way; there can be found some good
in everybody. Motives are tremendously complex; I do not be-
lieve there is one person or very many acts that are wholly
bad. There are probably objective benefits of some kind from
most sinful acts. Granting all this and recognizing that there
is no sinful motive which probably could not be more sinful,
yet we must say that the sinful will is eternally and unequiv-
ocally bad. Every choice is betv/een degrees of good; no matter
how slight the difference between them, the deliberate choice
of the lesser good is sin. The greater the difference between
the goods and the more deliberate the choice, the graver is
the sin. I recognize that acts and motives pass by almost
imperceptible degrees from non-morality to the most apparent
morality and I would not reject all relativity, but I v;ill
never recognize that deliberate choice of evil is anything
but bad. Individual sins are not absolutely bad, but Sin is
"absolutely and positively bad."
Hegel says at times*^ that man is guilty, and he
sounds a note of sorrow at the recognition of evil; but there
"is certainly a great difference between the way sin is re-
garded in this theory and the dreadful aspect it wears in the
judgement of religion and theology."*^ Hegel indicates the
*1. Quoted in Orchard 70
*2. Ibid. 72
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progressive character of morality, its evolution in the race
and in the individual, but his theory of sin is inadequate
for religion and ethics alike. There are some glorious pas-
sages in Hegel, but his system as a whole cannot escape this
criticism.
2. Spencer-- I have chosen Spencer not because he has
made any particular contribution to the theory of sin, but
because he represents the naturalistic evolutionists. He
resented being called a materialist, but for all practical
purposes he was that, and anything that smacked of idealism
was imported and necessarily inconsistent. His is a survival
ethics; he is al^ thoroughgoing empiricist. The moral scruples
we have are simply the result of years and years of reaction
to our environment; those things which were found to insure
the survival of the race gradually became habits and today
seem to have the force of divinely given commands. It is the
crassest kind of Utilitarianism; anything other than utility
in it is foreign matter stolen from Christianity,
According to Spencer, and according to all material-
ists and naturalists who are logical, sin is simply that which
does not have survival value. It is the blind intuition of
these "survival** teachers that life is worthwhile sustaining.
They have no reason to feel that it is . But they advise that
course of action that will best insure the survival of the
«I
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individual and the race. Nothing is of value except as it
does insure said survival. In such a universe the worst sin
imaginable would be suicide, since the only good is survival.
How ironical such a statement to the suffering millions of
earth; were survival all that was involved, suicide would be
heaven to the millions who suffer.
According to Spencer the moral sense is a product
of evolution. "Its origin is society, its sanction is utility,
its criterion is pleasur^r fitness to promote the general
happiness, its authority is law, custom, religion, public ^
opinion, etc."'^-^ This seems to lower ethics tremendously and
it does. Spencer iias heroically devoted himself to high mor-
al idee^ and he merely intended by his system to rationalize
and secularize ethics. Undoubtedly there was some need of
that; his system is a kind of reaction to Kant's thoroughgo-
ing idealism. But there is no dodging its implications; it
may seem to recognize the higher spiritual values but they
are made merely secondary values, instrumental in preserving
the race. The sense of sin is a shadowy feeling of "ought
not", the result of a series of unsuccessful actions and of
significance only in the preservation of the great^quantity
of human life.
1. Evolutionism and Idealism 47.
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3. Schelling — Schelling's theory of sin is really a
species of Manichaeism. His ideas "are speculative to the
last degree, and really admit of no confirmation, nor do they
seem to have any other necessity to thought than as a refuge
jtl
of despair."* Whenever a thinker concludes that freedom of
choice cannot account for sin, he is sure to weave some high-
ly speculative theory or to carry sin up into the nature of
God. There have always been undercurrents in church thought
which have tended to regard ultimate reality as dual, good
versus evil. The ancient Persians, the Gnostics, the Mani-
chae^ans and others have seen evil deeply imbedded in ulti-
mate reality. Schleiermacher was driven to believe that GrOd
was the cause of sin, though in a different way than He was
the cause of redemption.
Schelling begins by noting two principles in all
personality, ego and non-ego. Neither of these can be the
Absolute since they are dependent. Then the Personal God
cannot be the Absolute; the Absolute is the indifference of
subjective and objective, and of all contrasts. It is from
this dark Basis in God that all beings spring. The conflic-
ting principles are found in man also; in the separability
of the principles is the possibility of sin. Because of the
nature which man receives from this Basis or opposite in God,
man sins; yet he maintains that man is free.
*1. Orchard 60
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There is not a great need to criticize this theory. It does
nothing to solve the problem of sin: it carries sin up into
God, into an irrational "ground"; it obscures the personality
both ^jfK^ of God and man; it abolishes the idea of sin as we
conceive it and makes the universe a swirl of question marks
and shadows. And above all, "the crude theosophizing is en-
*1tirely uncongenial to the Christian way of thinking of God."'
4. Weisse — Weisse, just as Schelling does, seeks some-
thing beyond the Personal God. "Besides this primitive Reason
we must have the Divine Heart which conceives the images of things,
and also the Divine Will which freely works upon them, and so
begets the nature of God as personality and love. The self-
realization of God ia a process in tii];ie, preceding the creation
of the world. "*^ Matter, the actualisation of the non-ego of
God, is the metaphysical necessity of Evil. God cannot im-
mediately abolish the antithesis between His will and evil.
"The origination of sin in the creature is, therefore, not
to be sought in a conscious act, but is a genesis before time
of the personal will out of the natural spontaneity of indi-
3lt3
vidual beings."^
There are other necessitarian systems we might mention,
but these four are sufficient. The last two are altogether
too speculative and mythological for scientific thinking;
*1. Orchard 63.
*2. Ibid. 6Sf.
*3. Ibid. 64.
ri* ©sJto
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neither do they strilce at the heart of the problem. Spencer
represents an advance toward empirical and critical thinking
even though his utilitarianism is not lofty enough. Hegel
presents sin as the falling below the capacities of our nature
he shows insight in that the center of interest for him is
the development of the self, but his account of sin is too
artificial. None of them have adequately explained the origin
or the nature of sin. If sin is a necessity then there is
no sin and there are no moral standards. On the other hand,
we must ask if freedom of the will is sufficient to account
for the possibility of sin, its gravity and universality.
f
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jtJ. i?reedoraistic
It is needless to say that any system which does
not grant the metaphysical freedom of finite "beings at)ol-
ishes all moral distinctions and values. Calvinism has a
profound sense of the gravity of sin and, practically, is
thoroughly moral; in fact, it is through the desire to re-
cognize the dark character of sin that it denies freedom
to man. Hegel and Spencer have little appreciation of sin
or morality; the very spirit of their systems is deadly to
religion and ethics.- Yet despite this great difference of
attitude between Calvin and these evolutionists, they "both
theoretically negate the existence of freedom. Some of the
theologians v/ho are to be treated under this second division
also come perilously near denying the existence of sin as it
is generally understood, that is, the\^onscious^rong doing of
free moral agents; but they all defend the freedom of man
and his power of contrary choice.
I have divided this section into three parts, Re-
ligious, Empiricist ic , and Logical, according to the method
of the writers. The first method, that of Schleierraacher and
Ritschl, is revolutionary. Till their time theology had been
deduction and rationalisation on the basis of Scripture and
tradition; there had often been an appeal to experience, but
it had been somewhat artificial and limited. Schleiermacher
rejected all recognized conclusions of the church and began
(
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investigating the religious nature and Christian conscioas-
ness. He did his best to re-accept Christian doctrines and
did to quite an extent, iDut there were some which he reject-
ed. He said that experience is made up of Knowing, Willing,
and Feeling; that religion is nothing but pure feeling; that
even thinking about said feeling is not religion, but that
the theologian would have to accept this debasement of pure
feeling as inevitable if he would rationalize religion. Thus
with him Christian consciousness, the feeling of absolute de-
pendence, is the only scarce of theology. Ritschl uses much
the same method, but v/ith greater freedom. He says that sin
can only be knov/n through the experience of redemption; sin
is "the negative presupposition of reconciliation." *1 "The
Gospel of the forgiveness of sins is actually the ground of
2
the knowledge of our sinfulness." *
The Empirical method is the same as the Religious
except that it treats experience generally and does not lim-
it itself to the religious consciousness. It is the accepted
way of treating sin, or any other subject for that matter,
today. The older theologians would investigate experience
a little (guarding lest they should find anything new), and
then would turn to the Scriptures to corroborate their find-
ings. The new theologians only too gladly cast Scripture
and tradition aside and turn to scientific investigation;
the more contradictory to Scripture their conclasions, the
more delighted they are.
*1. Justification and Reconciliation 327
2. I bid.
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The Logical or rationalistic method is not so mod-
ern; it has "been displaced "by the other two. The one great
difficulty with it is that life does not conform to logic;
logic must conform to life. The philosopher in his study
may spin theories, lay down premises, and dravi/ conclusions,
"but when he is done he may "be farther from the truth than
when he began.
I am giving this introduction for the purpose of
showing that one cannot restrict oneself to one method and
form a satisfactory theory of sin. Theology and ethics are
composite in character and must "be treated as such. Phil-
osophy, science, religion, and experience all are determin-
ative in a doctrine of sin. Today the world has gone mad,
figuratively and literally, over experience, empiricism,
positivism. They all have their place, for the anthropo-
logical viewpoint and the study of man have gloriously
revolutionized, rationalized, and humanized our "V/eltan-
schauung'.'. But experience alone will never form a ration-
al philosophy of life. Religious experience corrorborates
,
testifies to, the truths of theology; it is determined iDy
them, it does not determine them. Here is the place where
Schleiermacher made his error; given a Christian conscious-
ness, he could analyze it, "but a Christian consciousness
would never have existed if it had not had its counter-
part^logical iDeliefs. Reject metaphysics and you "become a
t^edonistic utilitarian; confine yourself to logic and you
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leave life and practicality. Modern Positivists with their
scientific efficiency have dismissed the Creator and sastain-
er of the universe, and may shortly dismiss some other toys
to which we weak mortals cling. On the other hand medieval
theologians with apparently no obligation to life or science
constructed speculative systems that cannot "be assimilated
"by the critical mind. Only a comhination of the religious,
erapiricistic , and logical can satisfactorily treat the theory
of sin.
1. Religious.
(a) Friedrich Schleiermacher
"We shall exhaust the whole compass of Christian
doctrine if we consider the facts of the religious self-
consciousness, first, as they are presupposed t)y the anti-
thesis expressed in the concept of redemption, and secondly,
as they are determined "by that antithesis," *1 This indi-
cates the reason that Schleiermacher is called the father of
modern theology; he v;as the first one to show the necessity
of studying the religious nature itself and the experience
of redemption. He is right to a certain extent in saying we
exhaust doctrine v/hen we consider the facts of consciousness,
for there are many things v/e cannot wholly rationalize; he is
wrong in saying we exhaust the whole compass of doctrine. All
of his theology revolves around "the feeling of alDsolute de-
pendence", the God-consciousness, and its development. This
*1. The Christian Faith, § 29, 123.

(iod- consciousness exists in every man, whether or not he
seems to be religious. Sin arises and the God-conscious-
ness is hindered because sense has gained the supremacy
over spirit. All moral life is explained by this conflict;
yielding to sense gives pain because of the God-conscious-
ness, and on the other hand only determined effort and that
continually will keep sense subjugated to spirit. Schleier-
macher vacillates between making God the cause of sin and
holding man responsible for sin. Because of his attachment
to the absoluteness of God and the absolute dependence of
man, he cannot conceive that man should introduce moral evil
into the v/orld unless God had willed it. So that he concludes
that God willed that sin should exist, but that He v/illed it
in a different way than He willed redemption. The absolute-
ness of God and the freedom of man, he accepts as one of the
antinomies. He thinks quite persistently into these diffi-
culties which have caused controversy from time immemorial.
He considers the Fall given in Genesis 3, and rejects it as
unhistorical; he becomes quite involved in the psychological
problems of a fall from a neutral or perfect moral state. He
does not think that if man was morally correct he could ever
have done wrong; such a departure would contradict t>od's ab-
soluteness. He recognizes that, if liod caused or v/illed that
sin should be, the moral responsibility of man is dangerously
depleted, but he thinks it is the only position one can take.
Thus God ordained that in man the sensuous nature should gain
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the ascendence over the development of the Ood-consciousness.
This applies to the first pair also as far as we can conceive,
iDut we cannot know for certain since we do not understand
their self-consciousness. The social character of sin takes
the place of the doctrine of original sin; we are conscious
of guilt for our own sin and are also conscious of "being in-
volved in the guilt of the race. This race guilt is not
connected with any a"bstraction, "but v/ith the race as the sum
of its individuals, each one of which is affected 'by the sin
•a 4d5 i. o
of society and "Ibs^ in turn aficctcd "by it.
"Now while in general the manner in v/hich the God-
consciousness shapes itself in and v/ith the affected self-
consciousness can "be traced simply to the act of the individ-
ual, the peculiarity of Christian piety consists in this:
that whatever alienation from God there is in our affections,
we are conscious of it as our own original act, which we call
Sin; "but whatever fellowship v/ith God there is, we are con-
scious of it resting upon a communication from the Redeemer,
which we call Grace." *1 The two, Sin and Grace, exist "be-
cause God v/illed they should; they are essentially connected,
though we are conscious of Sin existing anterior to Grace.
Man^s "turning from God must like all else "be ordained "by
God; for of course man even in the state of sin is involved
in the natural order, and it is only in virtue of his position
v/ithin that order--with the entire range of which the divine
*1. The Christian Faith in Outline, § 63, 29
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causality is co-e3ctensive--that sin can develop in him at
all." *1
The original perfection of man does not consist
in a moral perfection possessed "by our first parents and
lost by the first act of sin. All we can grant, says
Schleiermacher , is that man had and still has a pre-dispo-
sition to God-consciousness;*^ today we may have accumula-
ted guilt and an added "bent toward sin "but we also have a
stronger God-consciousness.
"We have the consciousness of sin whenever the
God-consciousness which forms part of an inner state, or
is in some way added to it, determines our self-conscious-
ness as pain; and therefore we conceive of sin as a positive
antagonism of the flesh against the spirit." *3 "We are
conscious of sin as the pov/er anr". work of a time when the
disposition to the God-consciousness had not yet actively
emerged in us," *^ "Now our proposition goes "back to the
universal experience that in each individual the flesh mani-
fests itself as a reality "before the spirit comes to "be such,
the result "being, that, as soon as the spirit enters the
sphere of consciousness (and it is involved in the original
perfection of man that the independent activity of the flesh
cannot of itself prevent the ingress of the spirit), resist-
ance takes place, i.e. we "become conscious also of sin as
the God- consciousness awakes within us." *5 "Thus the
*1. The Christian Faith, §55, 269
*2. Ibid. 244 f.
*3. IlDid. §66, 271
*4. Itid. 867, 273
*5. Ibid. 274
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strength v/hich the spirit gradually re(iuires is the work
and pov/er of the period su"bseguent to the awaiting of the
God-consciousness, though of course in association with the
previously given spiritual forces to the promptings of which
that awaking was due; while the strength of the resistance
made "by the flesh and manifested in the consciousness of
sin, is due to the advantage gained "by the flesh during the
prior time, though again, of course, in association with the
corporate life upon which the amount of that advantage depends.
"We are conscious of sin partly as having its source
in ourselves, partly as having its source outside our own
"being." *2 That is, sin is "bound up in the solidarity of so-
ciety. "The sinfulness that is present in an individual prior
to any action of his own iDeing, is in every case a complete
incapacity for good, which can "be removed only iDy the influence
of Redemption." *3 "We admit then unreservedly this incapaci-
ty for good--good "being understood here solely as that v/hich
is determined "by the God-consciousness--"between the limiting
points of willing and doing, within which all self-activity
must fall. Yet we must not magnify our congenital sinfulness
to such an extent as would involve the denial of man's ca-
pacity to appropriate redemption, for that capacity is the
very least that can "be predicated of that disposition to the
*1. IlDid.
*2. I"bid. §69, 279
*3.
. nid. §70, 282
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God-consciousness which is inherent in man's original per-
fection." *1 This incapacity for good refers only to man's
personal activity and not to his receptivity; in redemption
it is not a cooperation with God, ""but a yielding of the
self to the operation of grace." *2 There is a measure of
good or virtue which can "be reached without the immediate
work of redemption: that may "be called "civil righteousness.
"Original sin, hov/ever, is at the same time so
really the personal guilt of every individual who shares in
it that it is "best represented as the corporate act and the
corporate guilt of the human race, and that the recognition
of it as such is likev/ise recognition of the universal need
of redemption." *3 It is not that Adam's sin has affected
us directly or that we all sinned in Adam, "but that sin is
social in character and influence. "Vv'hether, in fact, we
regard it as guilt and deed or rather as a spirit and a
state, it is in either case common to all; not something
that pertains severally to each individual and exists in
relation to him by himself, "but in each ^he work of all and
in all the work of each; and only in this corporate charac-
ter, indeed, can it be properly and fully understood." *4
In regard to the sin of Adam we are pretty much
in the dark, for we cannot understand the consciousness of
*1. Ibid. 283 f.
*2. Ihid. 284
*3. "Ibid §71
*4. :ibid. 288
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the first pair. V/e "must seek for something that v;ill ex-
plain the act as a whole. And this v/e can never find as
long as we assume an inner state in which there was no
spontaneous activity of the flesh, and the God-conscious-
ness alone held sway; for in that case no sinfal appetite
could ever have arisen in the pair themselves, nor could
Satan have made them iDelieve that God had fortidden some-
thing out of jealousy, "but their trust in God must already
have been extinguished." *1 In the first human "beings then
as in us, God ordained that the sensuous nature should com-
bat and surpass the God-consciousness.
"In all men (except in Christ, whom v;e regard as
sinless) original sin is always issuing in actual sin." *2
"There is no difference of worth hetv/een men in regard to
sin, apart from the fact that it does not in all stand in
the same relationship to redemption." *3 "Once sin is pres-
ent in man, he finds also in the Vv-orld, as his sphere, per-
sistent causes of hindrance to his life, that is, evils....
All evil is to "be regarded as the punishment of sin, "but
only social evil as directly such, and natural evil as only
indirectly." *^ "The dependence of evil upon sin, however,
can "be empirically established only as we consider a commu-
*1. IlDid. 294
*E. IlDid. § 73
*3. Ibid. § 74
*4. Ibid. :^15 f.
(
68.
nal life in its entirety; on no account must the evils
affecting the individual "be referred to his sin as their
cause." *^
"Divine attributes relating to the consciousness
of sin, even if only through the fact that redemption is
conditioned by sin, can only "be established if at the same
time we regard God as the Author of sin." *2 "As in our
self-consciousness sin and grace are opposed to each other,
God, cannot be thought of as the Author of sin in the same
sense as that in v/hich He is the Author of redem.pt ion. But
as we never have a consciousness of grace v/ithout a con-
sciousness of sin, we must also assert that the existence
of sin alongside of grace is ordained for us of God."
"If ecclesiastical doctrine seeks to solve this antinomy
by the proposition that God is not the Author of sin, but
that sin is grounded in human freedom, then this m.ust be
supplemented by the statement that God has ordained that
the continually imperfect triumph of the spirit should be-
come sin to us,"
No one "can transfer the guilt from himself to
common human nature; a man's sinful self-determinations are
his ov/n acts, alike v>rhether they issue from the sinfulness
*1. " Ibid. § 77, 320
*2. Ibid. § 79, 325
*5, Ibid. § 80, 326
*4. Ibid. § 81, 330
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that is part and parcel of the principle of his individual
will, or v/hether "by means of them that sinfulness itself be-
comes more and more confirmed in him. None of these cases
of determination, however, excludes the possibility of sin
"being related to the divine causality." *1 "V/e shall accord-
ingly be able to say that, as +he recognition of the command-
ing will is wrought in us by Goc?, the fact that the ineffica-
cy of the God-consciousness becomes sin in us is liJrewise
v/rought by Him, and indeed wrought with a viev; to redemption."*
Our own theory, says Schleiermacher , "is that sin was ordained
only in viev/ of redemption, and that accordingly redemption
shows forth as the gain bound up with sin; in comparison with
which there can be no question whatever of mischief due to
sin, for the merely gradual and imperfect unfolding of the
power of the God-consciousness is one of the necessary con-
ditions of the hum.an stage of existence." *2 And thus "from
that point of view the appearance of uhrist and the institu-
tion of this nev/ corporate life would have to be regarded as
the completing, only nov; accomplished, of the creation of
4human nature." *
This is Schleiermacher *s doctrine of sin. I cannot
see that it is really much different from Hegel's necessi-
tarianism.; if the former were not so avowedly religious and
*1. Ibid. 534 f.
*£. Ibid.. 336
*3. Ibid. 338
*4. Ibid. §89
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did not waver so much, it would probably be classed with
those theories which leave no adequate place for morality or
sin. If Schleiennacher had said that Sod ordained that man
should sin afterr/ards to be redeemed from sin, he might have
left a larger place for morality; but he does not say that.
Sin is not something to be dispensed v/ith; it "is one of the
necessary conditions of the human stage of existence." God
has ordained that man's sensuous nature should gain the ascen-
dency over his spiritual nature and that thus he should sin.
It is inconceivable that man should exist without sin, for
man is developed only by sin. Sin is not an evil; it is a
good, it is that without which redemption could not be, and
without which man could never progress. Such a conception of
sin is contradictory of all morality. If every man must sin
and no man is ever free from sin, then there is no such thing
as sin in the Christian sense of the term and the word had
better be dismissed as a hopeless delusion. If Schleiermacher
had meant by"sin", struggle and finite weakness, I would grant
that man must sin and never will be totally free from sin; but
he meant by "sin" acts or attitudes in some measure morally
reprehensible . '^'"^
He says that "throughout the entire range of sinful
humanity there is not a single perfectly good action" and that
there "is no difference of worth between men in regard to sin,
apart from the fact that it does not in all stand in the same
*1. Ibid. §69, 280ff.; §71.
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relationship to redemption." *1 He goes on to say that "all
actual sins must rank as equal not only in respect of their
nature and character, but also of their origin; for every such
sin is a manifestation of the universal sinfulness, and repre-
sents a victory, though "but momentary or partial, of flesh
over spirit." *2 These statements are inconsistent with the
"belief in the guilt of sin; if all men are equally guilty,
then no one is guilty. Schleiermacher regards sin as the sen-
suous nature overpowering the impotent G-od-consciousness ; it
exists in all men though in different forms. Of these vari-
ous forms of sin one is really no worse than ano+her. The
sins of the Redeemed are not harmful to society, however, for
the influence of the God-consciousness in them counteracts
the influence of sin. In it all man seems to "be the passive
victim of God-ordained impulses. Yet Schleiermacher contend-
ed that sinners are guilty and that moral distinctions are
valid. Orchard says: "Beginning with a desire to do justice
to the Christian consciousness, he ends by denying its pro-
nouncements." *^
One criticism often made of Schleiermacher is that
he gives a superficial, inadequate explanation of sin by in-
terpreting it as the predominance of the sense affections over
the spirit. Pfleiderer objects to this: "a true analysis of
*1. Ibid. 306 f.
*2. Ibid.
*3. Modern Theories of Sin, P. 77
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the moral consciousness, uninfluenced, "bj philosophical pre-
possessions will always discern in evil a conflict of the
selfish individual v/ill v/ith the o"bligation of the lav/ of
the whole, and ^herein a self-contradiction within the mind
itself, not merely a contradiction iDetween rrind and sense."*!
Ritschl says: "the conception of sin as the predominance of
the flesh over the spirit alv/ays depends upon the fact that
the spirit life is not covered by the laws of mechanism, but
that it is accompanied by the consciousness of freedom. But
who in attentively reading Schleiermacher ' s treatise can sup-
press the thought that the mechanical impediment of the spirit
by the flesh is conceived as sin, only because the spirit
l^nows that this ought not to find place?" *2
Schleiermacher does not account for the evil v;ill.
In fact he deliberately avoids speaking of the evil will be-
cause it seems to threaten God's absoluteness. He dwells so
long upon the occasions and causes for sin that he seems to
forget (at least he gives very little attention to) the real-
ly basic moral evil, that is, the evil v/ill. bense is sinful
because it hinders the God-consciousness, he says. He is
right to a certain extent, but he did not think deeply enough.
In tiie last analysis, it is not sense or anything else that is
sinful; it is the will that is good or evil, that favors and
hinders the God-consciousness. He gives a psychological ac-
count of the universality of the suppression of the God-con-
*1. Ibid.
*2. Ibid. 78
f1-
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scioasness, "but he does not tell us hov; man's spirit and
will itself "becomes evil. In fact he doulDts the power of
man to choose the evil if he was created good; and if he
were created evil then he is not responsible. Throughout
his treatment of sin he gives very little attention to the
power of the finite will or to its importance in determin-
ing the moral character; it may "be necessary in accepting
redemption, but even then it is quite passive and incapable.
But yet Schleiermacher professes to believe in the freedom
of man, and the guilt of sin, both for the individual and
for society. He does not reconcile the ought not of Chris-
tian consciousness v/ith the divine sanction of sin. "V/hether
we can allow the 'ought not' of the moral judgement and the
certainly 'is' of the metaphysical judgement to stand in
contradiction, or allov; the one to silence the other, or
v/hether we should attempt to reconcile them in some higher
point of viev7",*l he does not tell us satisfactorily.
To summarize my criticisms of Schleiermacher '
s
theory of sin:
1. First of all, I v/oald criticise his method. The
deduction of all Christian doctrines from the Christian con-
sciousness is impossible. The Christian consciousness is
created somewhat by doctrine and would not exist wholly apart
from doctrine. Christian consciousness corroborates rather
than creates doctrine. Vifhile this religious method in the-
*1. Modern Theories of Sin, P. 79
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ology is valua^ble and rich when it is com"bined with some
other, it is untrustworthy and "barren if completely disso-
ciated from the contrilDut ions and corrections of theoreti-
cal reason.
2. The second criticism is that he makes God the author
of Sin. Though he tries to avoid the moral contradictions of
it and though he tries to modify it, yet he concludes that
God is the author of sin. This really abolishes morality and
freedom, "but Schleiermacher is generally recognized as a free-
domist, pro"ba"bly "because he wanted so much to "be.
3. The third o'bjection I have is to his definition of
sin as the ascendency of sense over spirit. As Pfleiderer
said, sin is more than the conflict "between sense and the mind,
it is conflict within the mind itself. His definition is too
narrow.
4. The fourth criticism is mach the same as the second;
it is really the practical side of the second. It is that he
overstresses the super-individual character of sin and does
not connect sin v;ith the v/ill of man s^ifficiently to explain
individual guilt. That is, he emphasizes the strength of the
sense nature and the strength of social sin until he almost
o"bscures the fact of deli"berate, intelligent wrongdoing. I
"believe these four are the fundamental criticisms of Schleier-
macher 's account of sin.
(Id) Ritschl
Ritschl's theory of sin is the least "befogged of any
41
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we have yet treated. It is clear, practical, and moderate.
It is quite free from traditionalism and from theosophy. It
revolves, as Schleiermacher ' s does, around the religious con-
sciousness, and particularly around redemption and the Chris-
tian idea of the Kingdom of God. It has made tvv-o or three
valua"ble contributions to the Christian conception of sin and
redemption.
Ritschl says that v/e can only know what the "bad is
when we know the good. The more clearly we conceive the good,
the more correct our idea of sin; hence he concludes that v/e
can "best loiow the nature of sin when we have grasped Christ
and the atonement. He rejects the idea of original sin and
develops the idea of social sin, the kingdom of sin, which
Schleiermacher iDroached. He insists upon degrees of sin, from
the least sins of ignorance to the intelligen", comprehending,
deli"berate rejection of the good; the latter, he says, cannot
"be forgiven. He rejects the idea that there is any connection
"between sin and evil; the only evil that accompanies sin is
the feeling of guilt, and that is really a "blessing since it
leads toward reconciliation. The point where Ritschl is suti-
jected to the closest criticism is in his teaching that God
looks upon all sins that can "be forgiven as sins of ignorance.
I will attempt to defend his position there later.
First of all he states that our knowledge of sin is
received through our knowledge of redemption. "Sin is the
negative presupposition of reconciliation Since we have
to comprehend the fact of sin from the standpoint of the
4
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reconciled community, the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins
is actaally the ground of our knowledge of our sinfulness."*!
Men "were familiar with the fact of sin even apart from Chris-
tianity. But the determination of its nature, and the esti-
mate of its compass and its worthlessness , are expressed in
a peculiar form in Christianity, for here there obtain ideas
of G-od, of the supreme good, of the moral destiny of man, and
of redemption, different from those v;hich are to "be found in
any other religion," *2 These statements one cannot ciuestion,
though there are some who would not isolate Christianity from
other religions as definitely as he does.
He rejects the comparison of man's present state
with his original righteousness as ^he method for realizing
the nature of sin, "but he recognizes value in the Evangelical
conception. The "dogmatic doctrine of man must not "be filled
up by adducing elements from the Biblical creation document,
but by that spiritual and moral conception of man which is
revealed in the life-course of Jesus, and His intention to
found the Kingdom of uod." *2 The "Catholic interpretation
of the subject, according to which original righteousness was
added to human nature as a gift of grace, implies that the
Christian ideal falls outside the essential constitution of
man The Evangelical assiimption, on the other hand, that
our first parents were created v/ith righteousness as the con-
tent of their nature, is an expression of the fact that the
*1. Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. 327
*2. Ibid. 328
*3. loid. 331
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Christian ideal falls v/ithin the limits of man's constitution
and that in Dogmatics the general nature of man ought to "be
interpreted in the light of this standard. Conceived in this
fashion, the idea of i^i^titia originalis is confessionally
important and dogmatically significant; it is in comparison
a matter of indifference that no ground exists for supposing
that our first parents were endowed with this attribute." *1
He accepts Schleiermacher ' s revolutionary view of the place
of Christ. He is not the restoration of the world as much
as He is the completion of creation; that is, "the common
destiny of men, through which they attain their distinction
from nature and their lordship over the v/orld, was first
reali7,ed in its full compass in the self-consciousness of
Christ, and through Him made manifest and effective." *2
Sin is distinctly a religious idea. "A given ac-
tion, in the light of h'jman society and the law of the State,
is a wrong and a crime. But the same action is sin when it
springs from indifference tov/ards God, as the Benefactor and
Governor of human life. By bringing out this aspect we stamp
sin as a religious idea, as a characteristic value-notion. "*3
I think I have made clear in the Introduction the relation
"between sin and immorality, but Ritschl adds a new emphasis
^ in the definition of sin, that is, sin is fundamentally in-
difference to a person who is intrinsically worthy of all our
interest
.
*1. Ibid. 331 f.
*2. Ibid. 332
*3. Ibid. 374
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Sin can not "be known theoretically; the doctrine
of sin must Tae formed in accordance v/ith experience. We know
sin as the antinomy of the Kingdom of God; Ritschl calls it
the Kingdom of Sin, He rejects the Augustinian teaching of
original sin for this nev7 social conception. The principle
that the v/ill is made evil by actual sins, a principle v^hich
is opposed to the teaching of original sin, is one that we
all accept. "In the first place, on it rests every kind of
responsibility for evil which we impose upon ourselves. Only
if we discern in the individual action the proof-mark of the
independence of the will, can we ascribe to ourselves, not
mere individual actions, but likewise evil habit or evil in-
clination. ..... Secondly, education is possible only on the
presupposition that existing bad habits or evil inclinations
have come to exist as the product of repeated acts of the
will Thirdly, the assumption we make of distinct degrees
of evil in individuals—an assumption rendered indispensable
by practical considerations--is incompatible with the dogma
of original sin, v;hich asserts of all the descendants of Adam
an equally high degree of sinful inclination, and that the
highest possible, namely, that they have failed into universal
and obstinate resistance to the Divine good, and into the pos-
session of the devil." *1
Ritschl 's Kingdom of Sin gives more intelligible ex-
pression to the strength and universality of sin which v/as ex-
pressed, so poorly in the doctrine of original sin. "All these
*1. Ibid. 336
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grades of halDitual sin v/e include in the vast complexity of
sinful action when v/e form the idea of the kingdom of sin."*l
Each one iDreathes the tainted atmosphere and is affected by
the evil influence of society; and in turn each one contri-
"bates actual sin and evil influences to society, V/e cannot
estimate the effect of the presence of sin in society but we
know we are all influenced by it. This does not mean that
it is f3ometiiing s j.periir;posed on us; it is the work of society.
Nor does it mean that society is totally depraved; it simply
takes into account the actual presence of sin and its evil
effects. The Kingdom of God is opposed to this evil kingdom.
It is possible that one can live vvithout sin and the univer-
sality of sin is merely a generalization from the prevalence
of sin.
Ritschl rejects the -^hought that there is a neces-
sary connection betv/een evil and sin. Reason "forbids us to
adhere to the objective theory of the interconnection of sin
and evil as being the rale." *2 Evil may even be positively
good in developing character. He says "that the entrance of
universal sin has in no \vise had the effect of abolishing and
neutralizing the original character of the opposition between
the world and us, which was to serve as a restriction, and
yet as a stimulus to the development of freedom." *3 This
error is due to too narrow a conception of reconciliation.
*1. Ibid. S38
*2. Ibid. 354
*3. Ibid. 355
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Reconciliation "is not merely the ground of deliverance from
the guilt of sin, and from the evils in some way merited; it
is also the ground of deliverance from the v/orld, and the
ground of spiritual and m.oral lordship over the v^^orld." *1
He is very positive that there are degrees of sin
and makes a distinct contriliution to ha^martiology in his
emphasis on the place of ignorance in sin. "The assertion
that sin is infinite in its nature, even when removed "by the
redemptive work of Christ, is the result of a purely ration-
al inference"--and such inferences are too far from the truth
to "be accepted he thinks. "The distinction "betv/een sin as
ignorance and sin as final decision against recognized good,
is thinka'ble first of all as related to the concept of sin in
general. Sin in general is active and habitual opposition to
God and to the good--the good which men discern, with some
measure either of vague presentiment or of definite knowledge,
to "be the final end guaranteed by God for the human v/ill." *2
Sin is always "opposition to the good, that conception being
defined in an ethical sense, so that the least deviation from
the good or even the simple omission of the good already forms
opposition to; for the good must be unconditionally anr com-
pletely realized by the v;ill at everj/ moment."
It is interesting to compare Ritschl with Tennant
right here. The former begins by making sin very broad and
*1. Ibid. 357
*2. Ibid. 377
*3. Ibid.
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sinister; the least deviation or omission of the will is sin.
Then he alleviates the dar]^' picture by the introduction of
the great element of ignorance. Tennant begins by limiting
sin to deliberate, conscious wrongdoing; then, after allowing
for every possible foreign element, he expresses himself firm-
ly on the grave character of moral evil. They seem to be
about the same, and I rather thin^lc they are, though I thinJc
Ritschl shows the more profound moral insight. Life is shot
through with morality; I think v/e should first appreciate that
fact, and then
-
gra^ap- the weakness, ignorance, and handicaps of
men. At any rate, Ritschl is accused of dissolving sin into
ignorance, and Tennant of reducing it to isolated acts.
"Ignorance, also, is not the sufficient ground for
the confirming of the v/ill in sin; for the will and knowledge
are not v;holly commensurable with one another. Therefore,
neither a priori nor yet in accordance with the conditions of
experience, is it to be denied that ^here may be a sinless
development of life." *1 Y/e will have to be satisfied v'ith
saying that ignorant sins are forgiven. "V/e cannot, certainly,
avoid taking into consideration the fact that there fall under
this category those sins, likewise, which present themselves
to our human judgement as a thoroughly confirmed habit of
hardening (Eph. 4:17-19). But if we are to maintain our good
faith that such men are not regarded by God as past redemption,
the conclusion which suggests itself is that God looks upon
*1. Ibid. 377 f.
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their sin in a different light, namely, as ignorance." *1
I do not "believe that Ritschl meant to dissolve
sin into ignorance. He merely meant to shov/ the large part
that ignorance plays in sin; the greater the ignorance the
less guilty the sin. He says that those sinners cannot "be
forgiven v;hose opposition to God has come to full conscious-
ness and determination, and v/e cannot conceive how they could
"be forgiven; or rather we cannot conceive of men coming to
such a place of opposition. At least we cannot think of many
whom v/e have met v/ho have come to such a place; if there is
any impossibility in such cases, it is the inability of men
to repent "because of their self-hardened character and not
the unv/illingness of God to forgive. "V/hether there are such
men, and who they are, are Questions v/e cannot answer," says
Ritschl. The "love of God can "be conceived in relation to
such sinners as have not fallen into that degree of sin which
excludes conversion of the will. It is just this negative
relation that is expressed by the predication of ignorance
—
and nothing more." *2
There are no such decisive arguments against Ritschl
as are brought against his predecessors, but that there are
weaknesses iH his theory is unquestionable. The first criti-
cism is against his method; he avoided difficulties his great
contemporary did not, but, nevertheless, I contend that the
religious method alone is too narrow for the doctrine of sin.
*1. Ibid. 379
*2. Ibid. 283
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He does not show clearly enough the moral side of what he calls
the religious idea, sin. He does not state decisively enough
the guilt of sin, prolDalily "because of the stress he put on
ignorance. Orchard says he leaves "unresolved difficulties."*!
He says that experience contradicts Ritschl, for we are con-
scious of being forgiven of deli'berate sins.He^ays he does not
make clear why God cannot forgive the deli'berate opposer of
His will and v/hether or not God loves such thorough-going re-
jecters of the good.
I do not think these last criticisms of Ritschl are
valid. Ritschl did not clarify some points sufficiently, "but
I agree v/ith his general conclusions on ignorance. They are:
that ignorance plays a large part in most sin; that it facili-
tates God's forgiveness of sin and man's recovery from sin;
that, since we can see some measure of ignorance in every sin-
ner, if not in every act, we may reasonalDly conclude that re-
demption is impossible for the person whose "opposition to the
Divine order of good has come to the full consciousness and
determination." This impossibility may arise from the fact
that it cannot be that a finite being under the influences of
God and society is capable of being totally bad; it may arise
from the incapability of such a person to break his own self-
hardened will, or (the least likely) from the unv/illingness
or incapability of God to forgive (for reasons v/e know not of)
such a person. No matter what our conclusions about that we
know people who are progressively evil despite all good in-
*1. Orchard 86 ff.
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fluences and whom we have little reason to think v/ill ever
seek the Kingdom of God. And yet though I agree with Ritschl
on these conclusions I think he did not state the reason for
forgiveness. We are less guilty the more ignorant we are,
unless it is deli"berate or negligent ignorance. But after
we "boil sin dov/n as far as possible there is a measure of de-
liberate v/rong doing. And this is only forgiven "because of
the self-sacrificing, forgiving spirit of the Father, the
Christlikeness of God. That is the real "beauty and wonder
of the Gospel.
Mackintosh makes the criticism that is generally
made of Ritschl, that is, "he erases from the Gospel every-
thing remedial. Small sins, of 'ignorance', need no expia-
tion; great sins admit of none." *1 Again, I repeat that
Ritschl was not as clear in his exposition as he should have
"been, but that this criticism is a little too harsh. He ad-
mits that Ritschl "interprets forgiveness in terms of ethical
personality. To forgive is to readmit to personal fellowship"
not to remit external penalties. This is another of his sig-
nificant advances.
2. Empiricistie
(a) Pfleiderer
The theories in this group attempt to explain sin
from empirical observation. "The increasing popularity of
this method v/ith the modern mind is due to the general dis-
*1. Christianity and Sin, 134
*2. Ibid.
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trust of abstract or philosophical reasoning, v/ith the doubt-
ful conceptions it seems to start from, and the unworkable
conclusions it seems to reach; it is the fashion to bring ev-
erything to the test of experience, and to confine our atten-
tion to matters that have experimental value; and the induct-
iv^ethod of Science, which has achieved such notable triumphs
in humbler spheres, and which is now invading every department
of thought, has naturally gone a long way to popularize this
method." The spirit of these theories is particularly akin
to ours and their psychological study seems cuite rational,
but we must re-iterate that the empirical method alone cannot
adequately treat of theology in general or the doctrine of
sin in particular.
Pfleiderer in his treatment of sin in "Philosophy
of Religion" deals for the most part with its origin in the
individual life. The source of sin cannot be found in the
sensuous nature, or anyvv'here save in the "spiritual direction
of will". *2 Sin ig selfishness, seeking satisfaction out-
side the whole and opposed to the whole; it is "the resist-
ance of the particular v/ill to the Divine v/ill". But at
first it is not connected with God; in -^he child it has to
do merely with free choice. The "will is never in reality
the empty possibility indeterminism tal^es it to be, equally
capable of turning to any side and after any action, empty
again, undetermined v/ithout direction." *3 Yet it is a fact
*1. Orchard 89
*2. Ibid. (Quoted on 90)
*3. Ibid.
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that we are conscious that from the dawn of moral awareness
we find evil in us as a power, "the origin of which accord-
ingly must lie "beyond the conscious exercise of freedoir:."
Pfleiderer rejects the idea of pre-existence and the idea of
a timeless choice as too speculative; the only think to do
is to turn to the individual life. There the "psychological
genesis of evil is not difficult to understand"; the satis-
faction of natural tendencies is necessary to life, and the
tendency towards this satisfaction lies "in the essence of
the will, or indeed is that essence." *1
The process is atout as follov/s. Early in the life
of the child the will asserts itself in the satisfaction of
natural impulses; there is nothing wrong in that, "because
moral consciousness has not come and also "because it is only
in this v;ay that life is preserved. Soon the will of parents
and the conflicting needs of others inhibit the activity of
the selfish will. Through punishment and education and through
varied experience the moral consciousness gradually awakens.
The earliest inhibitions having brought the instinctive asser-
tion of the natively selfish will, we find v/ithin the self
with the coming of moral consciousness an already "powerful
inclination of self-will to lawlessness." The transition is
too gradual for us to detect the first sin; sin and guilt are
relative and are incumbent only when there is conscious oppo-
sition to a moral standard. Growth of knowledge and moral
possibility increases moral responsibility and guilt.
*1. Ibid. (Quoted on 91)
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"If accordingly evil only "becomes actual in the
lawless self-determination of the finite v/ill, then evil
must have its origin in the creature, not in Ood." *•'-
Yet evil "was roreseen loj God and ordained along v<ith the
good, not as a thing that ought not to be, "but as a thing
that could not not-be," *^ God's attitude toward us,
Pfleiderer says, must "be one of " sym.pat hy"
.
There is a very evident inconsistency bietween the
pronouncement of guil+ which conscience places upon us and
the "sympathy" of God. I thir> that Pfleiderer has given a
pretty accurate account of the origin of sin in the incividu-
al. There is one element which he should have taken into ac-
count, that is, the evil influences of heredity and environ-
ment on the inc-ividual. Granted then that his account of the
origin and nature of sin is pretty accurate. I do not think
he v^as compelled to say that sin could not not-be or that
God^s attitude toward us is merely one of sympathy. His sys-
tem could quite logically allov; for the possibility of not
sinning and for the guilt of conscious ' sin.
*1. Ibid. (Quoted on 92)
*2. Ibid. (Quoted on 92)
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(a) Tennant —
One of the most significant writers on the problem
in the last half century is Dr. F.R. Tennant. His three books
The Origin and Propagation of Sin, The Concept of Sin, and
The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin,
are quite important for us, the first two in particular. He
is the first English writer to acknowledge the theory of evo-
lution; he "set a long-needed example to English theology in
his frank endeavour to recognize the new facts concerning
man* s origin brought to light by scientific research, and to
discover what alteration they entail in the theological doc-
trine of sin."*"^ There is much that is like Pfleiderer in
his system, but Tennant gives more attention to the appearance
of morality in the race and he also gives more emphasis to the
element of guilt.
He recognized the seeming contradiction between the
universality of sin and feeling of personal guilt; feeling
strongly as he did the reality of guilt he modified the con-
of
cept universality. He concludes with Ritschl that the latter
concept is a generalisation from experience not a deduction
from a given principle. Instead of falling back on the doc-
trine of original sin, he establishes these positions:
(a) Man inherits the natural and essential instincts and
impulses of his animal ancestors; these are necessarily non-
moral, and there is no reason to ascribe to them any kind of
abnormality.
*1. Orchard 94.
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(b) Voluntary action in man appears before any con-
sciousness of right and wrong. There has been a period,
therefore, in the history of the race and the individual, in
which even volitional conduct has been innocent, however far
such conduct differs from that later prescribed by moral sanc-
tions and the conscience.
So far, sin has not emerged at all.
(c) A period is reached during which moral sentiment is
gradually evoked and moral sanctions are gradually constructed.
Acts once Imowing no lav; begin to be regarded as wrong. The
performance of them henceforth constitutes sin.
(d) The earliest sanctions known to the race were but
crudely ethical, and their crudity was but gradually exchanged
for the refinement characteristic of highly developed morality.
Similarly, the subjective sense of guiltiness, in the primitive
sinner as in the child of very tender years, would at first be
relatively slight, and would increase pari passu with the ob-
jective holiness and severity of the ethical code."*^ This
is a summary of Tennant's conception of the origin and growth
of sin in the individual and the race.
Perhaps before going any farther it would be wise
to give his definition of sin as presented in The Concept of
Sin. He associates sin only with that which is morally re-
sponsible. Sin is colored by a religious element; "it belongs
to the sphere of morality touched with religious emotion."*
*1. Origin and Propagation, Preface XXIf.
*2. Concept of Sin 19.
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"But, after all, it is the moral element in sin that is pri-
mary: this alone is universal."*"^ Only "conscious or inten-
tional activity accompanied by sufficient knowledge of its
badness or lav/lessness is sin."*^ What is not wilful viola-
tion of known law is not sin, but imperfection. The "funda-
mental requisites for the moral activity which constitutes
sin.... are respectively: a moral law to be transgressed; "1^
knowledge thereof, by an agent, sufficient to render him a
moral subject with regard to it; opposition between impulse
and reason; and lastly, intentional volition as an indispen-
sable factor in all conduct that is rightly to be called
moral. The standard is not the same; it varies with all
individuals and all times; it is a relative standard, i.e.
the knowledge of the individual. G-uilt is not easily deter-
mined; it rises by almost imperceptible degrees from inno-
cence, but it is nevertheless real.
In the individual there are involuntary stages or
types of the conative and emotional modes of consciousness.^
Before the dawn of the moral consciousness the will has been
accustomed to assert itself for the things which self desires.
Thus these natural impulses, which are necessary for the pre-
servation of life, have furnished the material for the self-
cent eredness of the will. When moral consciousness arises
*1. Ibid. 24
*2. Ibid. 27
*3. Ibid. 45
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the individual finds it easy to sin; but it is only when vio-
lation of right is intentional that it is guilty and only then
is it really sin. "Defined as broadly as possible, an impulse
is a conation operating through its own intrinsic strength
and in independence of the system of mental life as a whole.
It differs from instinct in that it is not wholly excited by
*1
external stimulus but is initiated by a craving."*
Grod has ordained that the will struggle against the
clamor of these non-moral but strong tendencies. The will
is biased in its gradual development because of these cona-
tive tendencies v/hich rule quite largely before moral con-
sciousness arises. These impulses (which are spiritual as
well as physical) are necessary to life and are morally neu-
tral, and yet they are the "material" of sin for they furnish
the struggle and the motives which are necessary to morality.
These are practically the same as -^fleiderer' s psy-
chological considerations, but Tennant goes farther and says
that the development of the race has been like that of the
individual. The "human infant is simply a non-moral Infant ";
as it grows from this condition into the recognition of par-
ental law and then moral law, so the race has grown from ani-
mal life to morality and religion. There is one great diffi-
culty with this statement. That is this, - the child is po-
tentially moral; we cannot say that of the animal,
*1. Ibid. 135
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Leaving the evolution of the race for a moment to
return to the universality of sin in the individual. "It is
simply the general failure to effect on all occasions the
moralisation of inevitable impulses and to choose the end of
higher worth rather than that which, of lower value, appeals
with the more clamorous intensity, Thus, practically, it
seems that everyone sins, but, theoretically, it is possible
for one not to sin and to remain sinless. Then again, the
transition from non-morality to morality is so gradual that
it is impossible to point it out, so that the sinfuljiness of
early acts gradually increases from zero. This explanation
is quite satisfactory in explaining the relative universality
of sin and the degrees of guilt; -satisfactory as far as it
goes. It leaves out the truth that is to be found in Ritschl's
kingdom of sin. There is a deeper truth than that of animal
impulses; it is the truth of the moral depravity of society,
We receive the influence of a society that has sinned and
acquired sinful character, and in turn we sin and add our in-
fluence to that of others. This is not the strength of nOn-
moral impulses, it is the depravity of wills and moral charac-
ter. The individual born into society not only is heir to
the animal nature, he is also heir to the influence of delib-
erately sinful acts and sinful charact ers. Whether or not
that influence reaches him through environment and education
*1. Orchard 97.
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alone or also through heredity is not all-important (though
I am of the opinion that it is both) ; the awful fact is that
it reaches him.
In his theodicy Tennant says "that responsibility
for the possibility of moral evil and for the opportunities
for its realisation lies with God," but "that responsibility
for the actuality of moral evil lies with man."*^ That
judgement is correct, but it is the judgement of a moralist
and not of an empiricist and an evolutionist. Tennant "judges
others mercilessly from a biological standpoint, and, if they
go beyond naturalism, condemns them. His weakness surely
appears when he has suddenly to desert his old standpoint,
and makes appeal to 'intuition', to a 'purified creationism'
,
to 'Lotze's Theism'."*^ The facts of evolution are for the
most part empirical, while freedom, morality and sin are
rational and ethical judgements. The two cannot be reconciled
if one starts out strictly as an empiricist.
Another thing which Tennant can never account for
while he sticks to empiricism is the appearance of morality
in the evolution of the race. It is a vain delusion to think
that moral can ever be evolved from unmoral. The atheistic
evolutionist must carry all that is evolved back into the very
first reality and then he can never account for the potential-
ity of morality without a moral creator. Even the theistic
evolutionist has some difficulty with the appearance of mor-
ality for he "must postulate a special forth-putting of divine
power when rational and moral mind first appeared."*^
*1. Origin and Propagation 122,
*2. Christianity and Sin 143. *3. Ibid. 141
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And some express a doubt whether such an intervention is
germane to evolutionism.
Tennant is not very clear in his treatment of this
problem. He holds that only those characteristics can be
transmitted which are connected with modifications of the
organism. Yet he believes in the evolution of the race, not
only in the limits of morality, but even from non-morality
to morality. In other words the development of the organism
from its most rudimentary form historically is sufficient
explanation for the difference between that most rudimentary
form and the spiritual, moral, and religious nature of man.
Such an inference is too crass for rationalistic theism to
accept. And Tennant does not accept it consistently. The
fact is that an immanent GkJd is the only explanation for
scientific evolution and for the appearance of new elements.
A windowless system of evolution is a logical abstraction.
Accepting Tennant* s account of the growth of the race and
the individual, we must assert that the rational and moral
mind can only be explained by the creative activity of Gk)d.
We must strike a compromise between the a priori and the
empiricistic account of morality.
Our estimate of Tennant then is that he is the most
modern of any we have yet treated: he has introduced evolu-
tion into the theory of sin, has developed the psychological
i
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and empirical method, and has at the same time kept a pro-
found sense of the guilt of man. His chief weakness is that
he does not allow the moral and religious consciousness the
authority which the conclusions he reaches demand. "Volition,
and volition alone is sinful. Conversely, immoral vo-
lition is affirmed to be sin - and nothing else: not disease,
or inherited weakness, or unavoidable effect of surroundings,
or anything but guilty and accountable transgression that
ought not to have been and might not have been."*^ A man
cannot make an assertion like that unless he grants the
will moral autonomy as Kant did.
3. Logical —
(a) Kant - This is the man who is responsible more than
any other for morally grounded metaphysics. He and those
who were influenced by him have given the moral and religious
nature an autonomous place in personality. Morality no longer
lives on the crumbs from the table of all-powerful intellect.
It might almost be said that the tables are reversed, but at
any rate among consistent thinkers the moral nature and the
religious nature hold as authoritative a place as the intel-
lectual or aesthetic. This debt we owe partly to Kant.
But there are some other considerations • "Kantian
ethics offer help to Christian philosophy and hamartiology
*1. Concept of Sin, 246f.
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in telling us that moral truth stands higher than any other
knowledge, and that in obeying our own reason v/e know from
inside what goodness means. But there are two drav/backs.
Knowledge in other regions - knowledge, as such - seems to
be a hollow thing. Secondly, the free and responsible actions
of man, it seems, predetermined like eclipses."*"^
Kant and Miiller both ground sin in the free will
of man and both are certain that sin is universal and that
man is personally responsible. But neither of them give an
empirical account of these assertions of the moral self
and the religious consciousness. They find the will preverted
and recognize that it must have been preverted by actual sin.
So they start back to find the first sin, but as far as they
go they find the sinful will beyond. Kant concludes that
the Choice must be a choice of Reason not of history; he post-
ulates a timeless choice of the individual. Miiller postulates
a pre-temporal choice of self and rejection of God. Coleridge
becomes one step more speculative and decides that Original
Sin is "a timeless act" of "all human wills collectively."
Returning to Tennant for a criticism of these in-
tellectualistic theories: the tendency is to regard sin in
its original stages too much as what it becomes in its worst
stages; the universality of sin has led to the belief in a
common origin of sin independently of individual self-deter-
*1. Christianity and Sin, 119 minism.*^
*2. Origin and Propagation 78f
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He asks, *»Can we find the ground of the possibility and occa-
sion for sin in our natural constitution regarded as the per-
fectly normal result of development through which the race
has passed previous to the aquisition of full moral personal-
ity?***-*- There is no doubt that the introduction of an empir-
ical evolutionary investigation would have eliminated the
artificialities and inconsistencies from these systems.
Kant fixed a great gulf between noumena and phenom-
ena, between the Practical and the Pure Reason. Between the
Rational and the Moral account of man there is absolute con-
tradiction. On the one hand "man is himself a phenomenon" and
therefore all his actions, empirically considered, are but
links in a necessitous chain of cause and effect. "If, then,
we could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to
their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action
which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognize to
be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions,"*^ On
the other hand, the sinner is regarded as wholly responsible
for his sin and just as if he had fallen from a state of innocence.
After having limited pure reason to phenomena, he
starts to investigate the practical reason. The starting
point is the categorical imperative: "act only on that maxim
whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become
a universal law." From this sense of "ought" he postulates
*1. Ibid. 81
*2. Quoted in Orchard 32
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God, freedom and immortality. But then arises the inexplic-
able fact of the prevalence of sin and violation of the
moral lav/. How a condition so universal could arise from the
mere idea of freedom is a puzzle unless there be a * radical
badness' in human nature. There are three grades of this evil:
frailty or weakness, impurity or mixed motives, and perversity
or depravity.
Kant does not believe that any man is altogether
bad; he speaks of the "indwelling of the Bad Principle along
!lel
with the Good; or, on the Radical Evil in human nature."^
He says, "by the notion of propensity we understand a subjec-
tive ground of determination of the elective will antecedent
to any act, and which is consequently not in itself an act."*^
"Now the term 'act* in general applies to that use of freedom
by which the supreme maxim is adopted into one's elective will
( conformably or contraiTy to the law) , as well as to that in
which actions themselves (as to their matter, that is, the
objective will) are perforraed in accordance with that maxim.
The propensity to evil is an act in the former sense (peccatum
originarium) , and is at the same time the formal source of
every act in the second sense, which in its matter violates
the law and is called vice)\ (peccatum derivatium) ; and the
first fault remains, even though the second may be often
*1. Critique of Practical Reason etc. (Transl. by Abbott) 325
*2. Ibid. 338
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avoided (from motives other than the law itself). The former
is an intelligible act only cognizable by reason, apart from
any condition of time; the latter sensible, empirical, given
in time (factum phaenomenon) . That is a summary statement
of the idea of a timeless choice of evil.
The weaknesses in Kant are quite manifest: the
dualism of phenomenon and noumenon; the lack of developmental
emphasis; the contradiction between necessary action and guilt;
the impractical, unempirical conception of the origin of sin
and of the nature of redemption. The latter is merely a kind
of reforra that is cold and non-religious. The great contrib-
ution he has made is the unchallengeable position he has given
the moral nature; he did not express it as well as Troeltsch,
Otto, and Bowne, but he laid the foundation stone for further
thought.
(b( Julius Muller —
Miiller has written an ambitious monograph of two
volumes on the Christian Doctrine of Sin; since his time there
has been no one so thorough and exhaustive. But it is too
speculative and "the method of treatment, ignoring on one hand
the transcendentalism of Kant, and failing to satisfy the mod-
ern demand for the concrete and experimental, is altogether too
scholastic and abstract."*^ He is quite a thorough rational-
ist and yet he marks some advance beyond Kant. He leans a
*1. Ibid.
*E. Orchard 49
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little toward empiricism; he recognizes the necessity of moral
development; he insists on degrees of guilt and on the existence
of other good motives besides that of duty. He does not have
the chasm between moral and intellectual nature. He has form-
ed a strong well-developed system that stood well until mod-
ern empiricism offered its more rational accounts of the ori-
gin of sin. It revolves around the guilt of sin.
He gives a lengthy discussion of the problem of
freedom and reaches the conclusion that is generally accepted
by idealists. We are subject to a "successive development
in which every moral moment appears as a mixed result of free
self-determination, and dependence upon the previously devel-
:kl
oped."'^ This is somewhat more satisfactory than Kant*s free-
dom, which is absolutely denied by his phenomena and which
teaches that each sin is committed as though it were a fall
from innocence. In general Miiller is much more matter-of-
fact than his greater countryman. The only place where he
seriously disagrees with modern thought is in his account of
the origin of sin. He recognizes development, degrees of
guilt, the religious character of sin; he has a personalistic
view of morality rather than a legalistic balance sheet. He
is not altogether free from the idea of stern justice and
payment for right or wrong acts. In speaking of the relation
of the sense of guilt to actual guilt he says, sin "demands,
moreover, an expiation, though the sinner be himself unconscious
*1. Ibid. 51
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of tiie relation in which he stands to the injured majesty of
the divine law."*"^ But even then he recognizes that man is
judged not by an absolutely standard, but by his own knowledge
of right; "it is requisite that the individual sin be pro-
duced by the will of the subject, with the consciousness that
it is sin."* "God's holy love not only precludes His having
any part whatever in the origination of sin, it implies His
emphatic negation of its continuance. With a personal being,
opposition to God*s will must at least be possible, but it
can not acquire any permanent value in a world created and
ruled by God.''*^
The real principle of sin is not pride or sensuality
or anything that is so simple; it is the principle of self;
not self-respect but self set up in opposition to the love
of God. This is quite Hegelian but it is more concrete and
than Hegel is
personalistic/ . "Having by our investigations thus far discov-
ered Love to God is the real principle of moral good, it is
evident that moral evil as the antithesis to moral good must
have as its inner principle the want of this love, in the
estrangement of man from God. Sin is certainly a perversion
of our relations to the world also, but as our true relations
to the world arise out of our true relation to God, the derange
ment of the former is necessarily involved in the derangement
of the latter; This estrangement of man from God is in
*1. Doctrine of Sin I 210
*2. Orchard 50
*3. Doctrine of Sin I 248
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itself the primary sin and the source of all other depravity."*"^
Miiller* s idea of punishment is that it is disciplinary
to some extent, but also that it is the "revelation of the
fact that the majesty of law has not been dethroned by re-
bellion against it. The moral law, which has to do with the
will, cannot directly force it as by a necessity of nature to
fulfil its requirements, the very conception of it as distinct
from natural law permits the resistance of the will; but it
maintains its character as law by realizing itself indirectly
through the punishment following upon such resistance."*^
He gives half of the second volUDie to the problem
of freedom. After having determined the nature of sin, the
freedom of the will and the guilt of sin, he starts to in-
vestigate the origin of sin. He is convinced that man's will
is made evil by actual deliberate sin and he is quite blind
to the possibilities of an evolutionary explanation of sin.
So he traces the life of sin back in an effort to find a state
of pure indecision. But he fails to find this aequilibrium,
this "moment when there is a perfectly equal balance of oppo-
site impulses."* This is the place where Muller*s error is
most apparent; he has grasped the facts of moral life but
when he starts to look for a moment of pure indecision he is
seen to be blind to the facts of moral development.
*1. Ibid. I 129
*2. Ibid. I 245
*3. Ibid. II 70
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He recognizes somewhat the mistake, for he says all
trace of morality in childhood is lost in "an unconscious
twilight." Furthermore, if "there were at the outset of our
conscious life any such an individual fall, wherein the will
emerged from a state of pure indeterminateness into a decision
to commit sin, from which commencement, likewise, our develop-
ment, hitherto normal became perverted, this first dark deed
casting its ghastly shadow over our whole life would surely
*1leave an indelible mark upon our memory."^ It cannot be that
the innocence of childhood is guilty of the blackest, most far-
reaching sin of life, that which is responsible for all suc-
ceeding acts.
"Thus we are driven to the idea of a sinfulness
lying beyond our individual existence in time, a sinfulness
which either directly or in its consequences involves guilt,
and therefore must have its origin in our personal self-
decision. It affects our conduct, our entire development
from the very beginning, and yet it can only have its origin
in our own act. This would clearly be a contradiction if our
personality had no existence previous to our earthly and tem-
poral life, furnishing a sphere for the exercise of that self-
decision whereby our moral nature is molded from the outset.
Thus the undeniable facts of human life and consciousness lead
us at least to the very same ideas to which a careful investiga-
tion of human freedom brought us, the idea That Created Person-
al. Ibid. II 71 ality
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Must Have Had An Extra-Temporal Existence influencing its
life in time.***-^
•^There is a three fold primitive state of man:
first, his state as conceived in the divine ideal; secondly,
his state in the extra- temporal existence of the ego; and
thirdly, his state in the temporal commencement of his earthly
development."* During this period of extra-temporal exist-
ence each individual has chosen self as the principle of life
and has fallen. The perversion of this fall, which must be
from a state of innocence and an act of the will, accounts
for the universality of sin and the absence of any absolutely
indetermined action in this life.
We cannot conceive of a state with no determinations
and a perfect balance of impulses, Miiller would reply that
there could be no true freedom then, and he is striving to
maintain freedom and guilt. But if there were such a state
we cannot find any reason why sin should have been committed.
There is no need, for an explanation of sin, to construe the
first sin as a deliberate fall from a state of neutral inno-
cence. He is right in concluding that from the first dawn
of moral consciousness we are torn by impulses and apparently
given to the pursuit of the principle of self. But his infer-
ring an extra- temporal existence in which we each individually
rejected God and enthroned self is far too speculative and med-
ieval for modern psychology. He is to be trusted in his assertion
of the fact of freedom, sin and guilt, but Pfleiderer* s and Ten-
nant's accounts of the origin of sin are more to be trusted than
his extra-temporal choice.
*1. Ibid. II 558 *E. Ibid. II 380
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C. Lesser Writers
There are some other men whom I will consider briefly.
S, T. Colericige treats the problem of sin in his Aids to Re-
flection. He says that the will is the source of all actual
sin; but he also says that the will is made corrupt by actual
sin, so that he is involved in an infinite regress and finally
concludes that sin is a mystery. He postulates, however, "a
timeless act" of "all human wills collectively" as the origin
of sin; such speculation about a Universal Will is meaning-
less •
John Tulloch in the Christian Doctrine of Sin, the
Croall Lectures for 1876, uses the historical method in a
limited way. "It will be our aim, therefore, instead of be-
ginning with the full idea of sin and appealing to the Scrip-
ture everywhere for its proof, to review the idea in its
gradual development ."^-^ He represents a little advance over
the conservative church writers, but he confines himself al-
most entirely to an exposition of the Biblical doctrine.
H. V. S. Eck' s volume. Sin, maices no pretense to
launch into free inquiry. He begins by stating that the
the
church's doctrines are/most satisfactory; then he endeavors
to defend
*1. Page 23
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them and to explain their difficulties away. It is practical
in its aim.
Evolution and the Pall, the Bishop Paddock Lectures
for 1910, by Francis J. Hall is a more critical study,
in 4;iBie -etnd -i-n H&{>i-r4-t^ It is an attempt by a to
reconcile modern scientific and theistic evolution with the
old church doctrines. It is a work of some merit and yields
as much as its author dares to science; it gives some time
to establishing theistic evolution. The chief doctrines af-
fected by the evolutionary hypothesis are theistic teleology,
creation, Biblical infallibility, and man's primitive state
and fall. To state one of the authors more conservative po-
sitions — "I believe it to be clear that the narrative im-
plies the non-necessity of man's first transgression, its
conscious wilfulness, and its being followed by loss of cer-
tain spiritual and supernatural advantages previously enjoyed
—
-including communion with God, and divine favor, immunity
from shame and sorrow, and the possibility of physical im-
mortality."*"^
There are numerous recent books on the subject of
sin: Christianity and Sin by Robert Mackintosh, The Christ-
ian Experience of Forgiveness by H. R. Mackintosh, and others.
But none of these profess to be a fully developed theory of
sin, though they are all modern in thought and treatment.
*1. Page 141
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Christianity and Sin is probably the best book on the sub-
ject in simple form. There are two other books which give
a critical survey of the doctrine of sin. One is The Doctrine
of Sin by R.S. Moxon and Modern Theories of Sin by W.E. Orchard.
Moxon takes a wider field than Orchard does; the
sub-title of his book is "a critical and historical investi-
gation into the views of the concept of sin held in early
Christian, Medieval and Modern times." He treats the subject
quite well, though, because of the wider scope, he cannot be
as extensive as Orchard in his criticism. It is an appreciative
survey. The last third of the book is devoted to the modern
doctrines and to what he calls "an attempt at reconstruction
of the concept of sin based on the known facts of psychologi-
cal evolution and on the new science of psycho-analysis," He
says that this psychological viev/ of sin must and does har-
monize the recognized facts of evolution and the spiritual
fact of sin and sense of sin as felt universally by man. This
constructive statement is far more satisfactory than that
given in Orchard's, for this reason: the latter does not
recognize the fact of guilt. A statement illustrative of
Moxon' s modern empiricism — "Original Sin may be defined as
the universal tendency in man, inherited by him from his ani-
mal ancestry, to gratify the natural instincts and passions
and to use them for selfish ends."*-^ "Actual sin", he says,
"manifests itself as selfishness resulting from over-individu-
alised personality."
^* ^octrine of Sin 246f.
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I will consider briefly Orchard* s statement of sin,
in which he dissolves away the guilt which we impute to our-
selves. He begins by stripping the sense of sin of its au-
thority; because of its relativity we are "bound to assume....
at the outset that this factor of varying degrees of suscep-
tibility does seriously affect our problem, and introduces
an element, the cause of which being unknown, prohibits us
from settling in any given case the proportion of blame due
to any man for his sin."*-^ The sense of sin then does no-
thing to determine guilt; it merely indicates the emergence
of the moral ideal. Thus he separates the sense of sin from
the judgement of guilt, which is "not a feeling, but is an
intellectual judgement." Granting the distinction which
Orchard makes, I still think he has no right to abolish
guilt. He is getting tangled up in a chain of logic that is
not quite logical. If guilt is an "intellectual judgement"
that does not abolish it. Orchard says that if you take any
given circumsteince of actual sin, you can by changing some
of the elements in the case avoid the actual sin; at least,
he says, we cannot say that any actual sin might not have been
avoided had circumstances been different. That does not elim-
inate guilt; allowing for all the elements internal and exter-
nal which seem to have driven an individual to sin, there is
still an element of personal, deliberate sin or it is no sin
at all. Without resorting to the dangerous practice of
*1. Orchard 125
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unlimited supposition, we judge coolly and calmly that there
have been times when we have deliberately done wrong. If we
are not morally blameworthy, then we can trust no moral judge-
ments and are not ourselves moral creatures. We cannot pro-
nounce- accurately on the actual guilt of any act or upon a
life as a whole; we do not know just how blamevrarthy we are
before God or just the actual evil effect of any action of
ours upon ourselves or society. But we can see that reason
demands that there be blame if there is praise; that reason
asserts without equivocation that where there is no possibil-
ity of moral blameworthiness there is no morality. The ques-
tion of punishment does not affect the problem. If there are
moral values, moral goodness, moral praise, there is possibil-
ity of guilt in the same degree.
The next snag on which Orchard sticks is this: if
there is such a thing as guilty sin, God cannot forgive it
without violating reason, ethics, and His own nature. The
difficulty is in thinking of guilt as without any degrees and
of right as absolute justice with exact payment of dues.
Orchard appreciates the reality of God's forgiving love, but
he still thinks of guilt as something that cannot be forgiven.
It is an intellectual moat that I think cannot remain long in
a Christian's eye. Our judgement is that only guilty sin
need be forgiven and that only thus is God's love shown.
44
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Orchard's theory is .somewhat as follows: Man is
finite, limited, and quite imperfect and unlovely, apparently
a mere animal. God draws near and man* s moral consciousness
is awakened. It causes pain to the heart of God to witness
so closely man's imperfection and the greatest evidence of
His love is in the giving of His Son. Man also is pained when
he realizes his condition. Some men yield to the moral ideal
and find peace in the life of conformity. Others turn their
backs on God and continue in their imperfection; when at the
end of an indefinite period they are faced again by the light
of God, the pain they experience will be in proportion to
their rejection of God. Sooner or later all sin must cease
to be "either by our cheerful acceptance of God's v/ill for us,
or only after long and severe discipline has convinced us that
^od' s will and our own deepest desires are for one and the
*1
same end."^ This he thinks accounts for all the facts of
sin and redemption.
It is an optimistic outlook, as he intended it should
be, and it takes into consideration most of the psychology of
sin and redemption.Despite the fact that it explains so many
of the facts of sin, yet it is meaningless without the recog-
nition of guilt. I think that practically Orchard recognizes
what is generally meant by guilt, i.e. moral blamev/orthiness
,
but he does not admit it.And then again, he might accuse me of
Manichaeistic tendencies, but I cannot be too optimistic about
the final abolition of all sin.
*1. Ibid. 162
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This survey of current theories leaves us with the
impression that sin is a hopeless problem that can be made
just what one desires to make it. Since the systems have
been diverse in treatment the criticism has been the same.
But the conclusion I have reached is this; in general the
correct theory of sin is that which harmonizes the facts of
evolution with the affirmations of religion and the religious
consciousness. To use our present material — Tennant*s and
Pfleiderer' s empirical evolution plus Kant*s strong moral
affirmations plus Ritschl*s social sin — these elements and
some others all need a place in our system or doctrine of sin.
{
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Constructive Statement
A. Nature of Sin.
My procedure in this constructive statement may
not seem to be the most logical, but I think it will give the
emphasis I wish to give, I will first treat sin as it is re-
garded by religion and morals, sin as a fact of consciousness.
Then after treating of its nature as generally accepted in
the deepest feeling of Christianity, I will consider the ques-
tion of its source. That will lead to the empirical procedure
which Pfleiderer, Tennant, and the modern psychologists follow.
In division B under section 1,1 have stated definite conclu-
sions on some of the problems; this will be not much more than
a succinct statement of a suggested theory of sin. It neces-
sarily will be eclectic and summary.
1, Wilful violation of known law —
It may seem inconsistent to define sin so narrowly
after giving such an inclusive definition in I B. But I do
not intend to limit sin to the wilful violation of known law,
so I will restate the definition of sin. Sin is that which
does not tend to produce or tends not to produce that ideal
goal for mankind, which goal is a hierarchy of values and has
for its key personality. Of course this definition applies
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only to the activity oT moral beings. Guilty sin is that
which knowingly hinders or fails to aid the progress of man-
kind toward that goal. Man is morally blameworthy only for
what he does knov/ingly. It is asked, Why, if only knowing
sin is guilty, include every activity of man which hinders
said progress as sin? Only guilty sin is sin in the strict
sense and practically that is the meaning which the term
"sin" has acquired. But theoretically, that definition of
sin is too narrow.
It used to be thought that ethics was limited to
the very definite choices between right and wrong. The mod-
ern valuational outlook has shown that all of life is shot
through with morality; Rickert and Windelband say that there
is an "ought" in every detail of life, and there is. This
kind of an ethical conception fills all of life with pro-
found significance; it is supremely personal, teleological
,
religious and moral. One who holds that ethics is this kind
of a science of values and that every value has an ought
cannot be content with saying that sin is just a wilful vio-
lation of known law. Guilty sin is such a violation, but
life is pregnant with morality and sin. The least opportunity,
the lowest value, have claims on us. From the most deliberate,
purposeful crime sin drops by almost imperceptible degrees
to the shadows of the subconscious and the non-moral.
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The moral life is not conformity to a few set objective rules,
it is a dynamic thing, it is increasing awareness to the
"oughtness" of life and the ready response to it.
It may be said that I am confusing sin with imper-
fection^; I think not. Imperfection is part of the race;
individual imperfections are part of each one of us. Imper-
fection is the "given" in us out of which we are growing.
Imperfection hampers us and causes us pain, but it is not
always sin. Sin and imperfection are contiguous. They are
both imperfection in human nature: the most deliberate
wrong-doing is one extreme; given imperfection with respon-
sibility on God or society but not on the individual is the
other extreme. The moral blameworthiness is measured by the
degree of knowledge or the degree of capability to be other-
wise. It is a sliding scale: the moral individual is pro-
gressively realizing the responsibility of eliminating im-
perfection; and on the other hand the imperfection which is
unconscious or "given" is slowly rising to imperfection
which is conscious or knowing. Imperfection will never be-
come altogether conscious nor will it ever become altogether
unconscious. God has made us finite, growing creatures; we
shall never be anything else. There maybe some imperfections
to which we are heir which we shall never be able to overcome
and for which we shall never be responsible. On the other
hand, we would have to drop back to the brute or to insanity
t
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to become altogether irresponsible; and probably there is a
kind of responsible ^even among insane persons. Picture im-
perfection as a pole protruding from the surface of a lake;
the depths of the lake represent unconsciousness and the at-
mosphere above the surface represents consciousness. The top
of the pole is clearly seen and part of that which is beneath
the surface. Picture the pole slo\7ly rising — that is the
growing moral life. That is the relation between sin and
imperfection. It is sinful not to endeavor to burn the pole
(imperfection) off at the surface and it is sinful not to
keep raising the pole that more may be burned off.
This has been to show the progressiveness of the
moral life and the shades by which conscious, wilful sin
becomes unconscious imperfection of any kind. The reason
that I call this division the "wilful violation of knoTra law"
was that I might make clear the fact that there is such a
thing. At the other end of the pole from unwitting imperfec-
.
tion is deliberate, purposeful violation of known law. To
deny this is to submerge ourselves and abolish morals,
2, Guilt
The existence of guilt is affirmation of the moral
and religious consciousness. It is not an empirical assertion
and cannot be arrived at by an empirical study alone. The
naturalistic evolutionist can never make ethics anything more
than utility. Moral blameworthiness cannot attach to any
t
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being that is not morally conscious and created a moral being
by God. It is the normal moral judgement of man that there
is an intrinsically right and an intrinsically wrong, that
we are free to act rightly or wrongly, and that we are respon-
sible for acting wrongly insofar as we know we are doing so.
This judgement exists indelibly regardless of the variations
in particular cases.
Some wrongly identify guilt and punishment. Guilt
may mean either liability to punishment or moral blameworth-
iness. A man may violate any 0 objective law unknowingly
and yet be subject to punishment and guilty in that sense.
Nature condemns her subjects whether they violate her laws
deliberately or unwittingly. Punishment is an insoluble
problem as far as the limits of this life are concerned.
The wicked blossom as the green bay tree and the righteous
ne2^t
bide their time convinced that in the/ life goodness shall be
rewarded. The office of punishment the theist believes is
largely disciplinary and corrective. This does not abolish
law and put in its place a backboneless 4-fte4.-|)44 -sentiment.
The Christian is convinced of the grandeur and sternness of
the moral law and the awfulness of violating it. And yet we
cannot affirm that there will be exact payment of rewards and
exact inflicting of punishments. The Christian's faith in the
goodness of God is sufficient answer to this problem; both jus-
tice and love are commingled in the death on the Cross.
(
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But ethics and religion use the term guilt in a
different sense; it is moral blameworthiness incurred only
in rational wilful violation of known law. There are degrees
in guilt passing from the most glaring and deliberate to that
which hovers between guilt and innocent imperfection. Guilt
is in inverse proportion to the incapability of acting other-
wise than wrongly. The force of heredity, environment, and
evil example towards sin lessens guilt; the same may be said
of ignorance. Sin and guilt do not burst into life as a
thundercloud; they emerge gradually.
There is a distinction between actual guilt and the
sense of guilt; by actual guilt is meant blameworthiness ac-
cording to the knowledge of good the individual has, not ac-
cording to a absolute unchangeable standard. The second phrase
sense of guilt, is a misnomer, or at least it is not quite
clear. Guilt is a judgement of blameworthiness; the sense of
sin is a complex of religious debasement before God, of psy-
chological depression and pathology, of judgement of guilt.
The modern psycho-analysts have emphasized the second of
these elements and the first until they have lost sight of
the third altogether. Combine with their conclusions the
scientist's tendency toward determinism and the sense of sin
becomes a phantom and the judgement of guilt pure "schein".
Granting the other elements in the sense of sin and granting
the discrepancy between actual sin and the sense of sin, the
Christian still affirms that there is such a thing as guilt.
If there is no guilt, there is no morality.
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3. Depravity —
I mean by this term the effect that wrong-
doing, deliberate wrong-doing particularly, has upon the in-
dividual and upon society. There is ^io^a distinct difference
between the animal impulses which remain in man and the de-
pravity of will which is brought about by man's own moral
wrong-doing. The one is somewhat outside the will, the other
is a perversion of the will itself. The one is morally neu-
tral, the other is morally blamev/orthy . The one is the "ma-
terial" of sin as Tennant calls it, the other is the most
tragic element in sin itself.
In the first place, it v/oula never be questioned
that individuals become morally depraved by their own sinful
life. Their conduct not only brings suffering and external
pain to themselves and society, but it also blunts their
moral sensibilities, discolors their souls, and paralyzes
their wills for good. This is a phenomena that we observe
only in man. The rejection of the higher principles of life
and conduct sends man, not^to the animal kingdom, but below
the animals to grovel in moral degradation. It is not common
for moral beings to descend so low, but the principle is true,
i.e. the nobler the possibilities for good the deeper dyed
the sin. Of course the more evil the individual becomes the
less moral consciousness he has and possibly the less respon-
sibility attaches to particular deeds. But for one created
•
119
for moral alertness and for communication v/ith deity, such
a condition of moral insensibility is intrinsically the most
undesirable
.
But depravity is also social, not in the sense that
Augustine interpreted it, but as Ritschl interpreted it in
his Kingdom of Sin. As Schleiermacher said, it is " in each
the work of all and in all the work of each." We are heirs
to the evil of our forefathers and v/e contribute to the evil;
the social solidarity of sin binds us together inextricably.
Some sin of ours may influence a life near us and continue
to spread like the ripples from a pebble dropped in the water.
Every good and every evil deed is falling on the surface of
society like rain; we cannot compute the actual effect of
any deed or life. We can but console ourselves by our good
Intentions and by the predominance of the good over the evil
in our lives. Besides the native impulses to which every
child is heir, there is the evil influence of society, i.e.
heredity, and environment, education, and everything that is the
result of past sin. Men have sinned and the influence of sin
has been spreading ever since the first v/rong-doing of a moral
being. That is the truth which is represented by Ritschl'
s
Kingdom of Sin. The realization of the tremendous extent and
blackness of sin and the individual's responsibility for his
part in it has been a characteristic of all the greatest re-
ligious souls. For a man to deny the truth of it is to brand
himself as somewhat insensible morally.
<
120.
B. Origin of Sin.
An understanding of the origin of sin is quite ne-
cessary to modify and to ration^ze the doctrine. But no the-
ory of its origin can negate the existence of moral evil.
The pronouncements of the moral nature must he harmonized with
the facts of experience and the laws of the intellect; of
course the more vivid an element is the more firmly one is
convinced of its truth, but one can never invalidate another.
I re-iterate with Kant, Troeltsch, Otto, and Bowne that the
moral nature and the religious nature stand in their own
right
.
1. Individual choice in time (not universal) —
This is the first suggestion as to the origin of
sin. It might be suggested that each individual comes to the
first moral choice, pauses perfectly balanced, then makes
the choice either for good or evil. The life subsequent fol-
lows the choice that is made at that moment. Probably not
every one makes the choice for evil, but it is apparent that
most people do. Regardless of the conditions of society
each individual comes to the moment of absolutely undeter-
mined choice and makes the decision for right of wrong.
I do not know that this theory of the rise of sin
has been suggested, but I am just erecting it to note its im-
practicality . It does not appreciate the super-individual,
progressive character of sin and it does not have a regard
for the actual psychological beginnings of sin.
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S. Primitive fall and original sin —
By this I understand the doctrine somewhat as it
was presented by Augustine and the older church theologians.
It is the opposite extreme from Pelagianism. It teaches the
fall of the first man and the actual or representative par-
ticipation of every man in that act. It teaches the guilty
depravity of every infant. Humanity is a massa perditionis,
utterly incapable of any good and meriting eternal punishment
even before any sinful act is committed. Despite this and
despite the fact that Augustine was a predestinarian, he
still tried to preach human freedom.
The objections to this are manifold. Human nature
condemns it as utterly dark, cold, and opposed to God and
man alike. The only redeeming features about it are that it
arises in religious men in the midst of a heathen world and
that it has a sense of the grave character of sin. Against
it we may say that guilt is inalienable; that man is made in
the image of God and is depraved only as he turns from God;
That humanity's virtue is its own and not a foreign divine
element; that men are free to choose the right and the grace
of God; that this theory does not agree with the psychologi-
cal, empirical beginnings of sin.
3. Extra-temporal or timeless origin —
We have considered Kant*s timeless choice, Cole-
ridge's timeless act of all wills^ollectively , and Muller'
s
extra-temporal choice of the self principle. Our conclusions
I
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were against them for the following reasons: they are too
speculative and abstract; they conceive of sin as a fall from
a state of absolutely balanced impulses; they do not appreci-
ate the evolutionary character of morality. These men were
convinced of the reality of sin and freedom and were seeking
for a rational account of it. Their account reveals the ne-
cessity of a new conception of the struggles within the mor-
al self.
4. Epiricism and conclusion —
This new study of the origin of sin is the result
of science, evolution, and psychology. It is represented in
this paper by Pfleiderer and Tennant. It propounds first
that the race has developed from the crudest life to our
present moral status, allowing pooaibly for the creative
power of God at the moment when reason and morality emerge.
It propounds that the development of the individual is the
same; that there is first the predominance of impulses and
the assertion of will for the protection of self; that there
is the gradual dawn of the moral law, the failure of the self-
centred will to conform, and the gradual increase of guilt
from zero. This accounts for the prevalence of sin, for the
struggle out of which sin arises, for the degrees of guilt,
for the selfishness of the will at the awakening of moral con-
sciousness. It rationalizes the sin of the earliest man and
the sin of individuals today. It accounts for the presence of
sin in the grov/ing life of man, and yet at the same time recog-
nizes the personal guilt of those who knowingly do wrong.
t
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I conclude with asserting the facts of the moral
consciousness, i.e. the reality of moral evil, guilt, and
depravity, individual and social; and with adopting the evo-
lutionary account of the origin of sin. These two have been
regarded by some as necessarily contradictory. If either is
extreme they are contradictory, but modified their harmoniza-
tion gives the only rational account of the nature and origin
of sin.
C. Redemption.
The Christian doctrine of sin is greatly influenced
by its doctrine of redemption and vice versa. Ritschl started
from the Christian experience of justification and reconcili-
ation to formulate his concept of sin. While he was somewhat
limited in his field, we must recognize that his principle is
valid as far as it goes. We can never know the measure of
the darkness of sin until the light of the Gospel in the face
of Jesus Christ illumines our moral consciousness. And we can-
not conceive of the love and forgiveness of God until we see
the self-sacrifice of God in Christ reconciling the world to
Himself. These two poles are the genius of Christianity - a
perception of the groat- awfulness of sin and a grasp of and
trust in a loving God and Redeemer. As generations come and
go Christian Redemption stands out pure, sublime, satisfying
the individual's and the race's needs; and the world's greatest
need is victory over moral evil.
I
Summary
The modern interpretation of sin is quite revolu-
tionary both in the popular attitude on the question and
in the systematic treatment of it. The subject does not
have widespread interest today. There are some serious-
minded people to vfhom sin is the same fearsome spectre it
always was, but in general society regards it without any
qualms and indulges without too many compunctions of consc
science. There are reasons for this situation, some of
which are happy and predictive of good, some of which are
deplorable.
The irreligious spirit of today has tended to wipe
out the sense of sin, which thrives best in sensitive re-
ligious souls. That spirit is balanced by strong social
consciousness with the result that sin is strictly moral and
not religious. Psycho-analysts are revealing the pathologi-
cal element in the sense of sin with the result that the
judgment of guilt no longer has any part in the sense of sin.
Beginning with Schleiermacher religious thinking has had for
its key and cue religious experience itself; that is one rea-
son for the anthropological emphasis of today. Evolution
with its theory of the progressiveness of the race and the
individual has revolutionized history. Rationalism has re-
jected authoritarianism and supernaturalism. Science has
tended toward determinism because of its persistent effort
to fill out the chain of cause and effect. These influences
I
are valualDle but their inferences have "been carried to ex-
tremes so that religious sensitiveness and the moral judge-
ment of guilt have been slipping from us.
I spent relatively a long time in discussion of
the problems of sin. It may seem a little out of proportion
but the clarification of some difficulties and the statement
of some definitions before the treatment of the current theo-
ries seemed advisable. Sin is that activity of moral indi-
viduals v/hich tends not to produce for all manl^ind the goal
4
v/hich is set up by leal Utilitarianism; that goal is a complex
hierarchy of values with personality as its key. That is the
broad definition of sin. G-iilt^/ sin is the v/ill^ful Icnov/ing
hindrance of the progress tov/ard that goal. I first give the
broad definition of sin to objectify morals and sin, and to
give a stimulus to the moral person not only to seek con-
formity with his own standard of life but also to raise his
standard. It is a truism to say that freedom of the will is
necessary to morals. Sin is a step downward; sin has an ac-
cumulative effect on the indiviri.ual and society. Evolution
gives the most satisfactory account of the origin of sin, if
it accepts these truths which the Fall and original sin try
to express.
None of the necessitarian theories of sin really
allov/ for sin at all. If moral evil is necessary it is not
moral evil. Had these men, Hegel, Schelling, Weisse, under-
stood the empirical origin of sin they might have been free-
m
domists. They v/ere driven, "by the inexplicability of sin
as a fall from pure maturity, to assert that God was the
author of it. The freedomistic theories have all made con-
trilDutions, but they have all "been limited. Muller and Kant
started from conscience, the moral law, freedom and guilt;
in seeking the origin of sin they fell into unnecessary
speculation, Schleiermacher and Ritschl were less dogmatic
and philosophical; starting fron Christian experience itself
they made distinct advances. The importance of Pfleiderer
and Tennant is that they introduced the psychological and
evolutionary account of sin.
The Christian doctrine of sin asserts the auto-
nomous, authoritative place of the moral ana the religious
nature. They are subject to development; that is the only
way they Cind themselves. But regardless of development and
variation the great moral principles remain, that is, freedom,
goodness, moral evil, and guilt. It asserts the religious
character of sin, that sin is most clearly revealed in the
light of the Gospel and Christian redemption. It asserts the
depravity of the individual that sins and the evil influence
of a society v/hose members sin. It asserts the gradual emer-
gence of morality and the self-centredness of the v;ill through
activity before moral consciousness. Some think that these
assertions cannot be harmonized. They must be, they v/ill be,
and they are being harmonized.
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